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ABSTRACT 
 
Title    :   The legal and practical aspects of places of refuge in the context of salvage 
Degree:   Msc 
 
 
The dissertation is a study of the issue of places of refuge with emphasis placed on 
salvage-related matters. 
 
Apparently the question of whether ships in distress shall be allowed to enter places 
of refuge has its answer in whether these ships have such a right, and whether 
Coastal States have the obligations to allow entrance.  However current international 
law regime seems unable to provide an unequivocal answer. 
 
Let alone the legal issues, no easy answer can be found as to, from a practical point 
of view, what are the desirable actions expected to be taken by respective parties.  
Ongoing debates have led to some solutions in order to achieve a harmonized 
practice, represented by the IMO Guidelines, which aim at providing a standard rule 
of behaviour to be followed by those involved. 
 
However, it is necessary to examine to what degree such solutions have removed 
current obstacles which hamper the achievement of an optimal result – while the 
criteria for the term ‘optimal’ is questionable in itself.  Furthermore, some elements 
might have influence on the degree to which such solutions are actually adopted by 
decision-makers, and these elements need to be considered in details. 
 
Among others salvage related issues are prominent components that make the 
situation complex and at variance.  Salvage is, self-evidently, deeply intertwined 
with shipping accidents, pollution prevention, state interventions, and places of 
refuge.  Diversities in the appreciation of the term ‘salvage’ and in different national 
policies in this regard, as well as the possible conflict between the private salvors’ 
interests and the public implication of salvage operations, can not be ignored. 
 
The purpose of the ongoing debate is to find an answer as to what respective parties 
are legally bound to do, and what should they do from a practical point of view, to 
achieve a ‘best’ result when a place of refuge becomes probably necessary following 
an accident at sea; so is the aim of this essay.   It will start with the respective legal 
rights and obligations of parties involved and their interests at risk, followed by an 
analysis of the conflicts of interests and some protruding problems, as well as a 
review of some of the current approaches and proposals, and then tries to put forward 
further suggestions accordingly. 
           
KEYWORDS  :  places of refuge, salvage, accidents at sea, intervention, marine 
pollution, risk assessment. 
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CHAPTER 1    INTRODUCTION 
 
 
                                                
The Prestige incident in the end of the year 2002 has been followed by claims and 
legal actions as well as fierce debates, either within IMO or through various media or 
political channels.  Among the hot topics were issues concerning places of refuge for 
ships in distress, though they were not raised for the first time.  The earliest modern 
example in which coastal States ordered a casualty to be destroyed in the open sea in 
order to control pollution to the coastline might be the Torrey Canyon incident in 
1967; and such a phenomenon – called ‘maritime lepers’ at that time – had been 
observed with ‘increasing frequency’ and had given rise to concern in the late 
1970’s1, following the Andros Patria2, the Christos Bitas3 and the Atlantic Empress 
incidents.   More recently, the need to review the ‘customary regime’ covering such 
issues had been internationally recognized ‘on an urgent basis’ following the Erika4 
and the Castor incidents in 19995.  The IMO Resolution A.949(23) adopted on 5 
December 2003, Guidelines On Places of Refuge For Ships In Need of Assistance, 
represents the achievements of international effort up to present time. 
 
An introduction to the issue has been well summarized in the Resolution: 
 
 
1 Colin de la Rue & Charles B. Anderson, Shipping and the Environment – Law and Practice 
(London : LLP 1998) at 823 – 824. 
2 See Norman Hooke, Maritime Casualties 1963 – 1996 2nd edition (London: LLP,1997), at p. 42. 
3 See Aldo Chircop, ‘Living with ships in distress – a new IMO decision-making framework for the 
requesting and granting of refuge’, WMU Journal of Maritime Affairs, 2004, Vol. 3, No. 1, at p.34 
4 For more information on the Erika accident see IMO ‘Information Resources on the Erika Accident 
and the 2001 amendment to Regulation 13 G of Annex I to MARPOL 73/78’, 
http://www.imo.org/includes/blastDataOnly.asp/data_id%3D11910/Erika%283May2005%29.doc.  
5 Op. Cit. 3 Aldo Chircop at p31. 
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‘When a ship has suffered an incident, the best way of preventing damage or 
pollution from its progressive deterioration would be to lighten its cargo and 
bunkers; and to repair the damage.  Such an operation is best carried out in a 
place of refuge. 
 
However, to bring such a ship into a place of refuge near a coast may 
endanger the coastal State, both economically and from the environmental 
point of view, and local authorities and populations may strongly object to the 
operation. 
 
While coastal States may be reluctant to accept damaged or disabled ships 
into their area of responsibility due to the potential for environmental damage, 
in fact it is rarely possible to deal satisfactorily and effectively with a marine 
casualty in open sea conditions.’6 
 
Accidents, especially tanker accidents that impose a major threat to the environment 
usually involve salvage, oil spill response, state intervention, and pollution liability 
and compensation.  These issues are closely related.  For example, salvage operation 
can be either carried out by a private salvor, or by government agencies as 
compulsory salvage7, which then can be considered as part of the oil spill response 
operations.  Or, the orders given by the coastal State that the casualty should be 
towed away from the coast can be treated as both intervention measures and State’s 
monitoring and control over salvage operation.  In circumstances like these, the 
essence of the problem is much more than a simple question of whether the ship in 
distress can have the right to enter a certain place within the internal waters or 
territorial sea of a coastal state.  Relevant is also what actions a coastal state can take 
or what orders it can give in various maritime zones, i.e. whether the ship will be 
allowed to carry out certain operations to retrieve the property and to prevent or 
                                                 
6 IMO Resolution A.949(23) Annex, paragraphs 1.3 – 1.7. 
7 See Op. Cit. 1Colin de la Rue at p 822. 
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mitigate the environmental pollution, and the degree to which such operations are 
subject to the command and monitoring of the coastal state.    
 
An article by Eric Van Hooydonk The obligation to offer a place of refuge to a ship 
in distress provides a good summary of the four attitudes towards this question 
together with critical assessments, namely, the absolute right of entry, the absolute 
right of refusal, ‘balancing interests’, and ‘good management on the basis of the right 
of access’8.  However, some arguments contained in the article are not very 
convincing.  For instance, the right of innocent passage was cited to support the view 
of absolute right of access of foreign ships in distress9, while this is quite irrelevant 
when the intended place of refuge is a port or other internal waters of a coastal State.  
Furthermore, it ignores the differences between situations where entry is necessary 
for the purpose of saving human life and where it is not10.   
 
Maritime accidents inevitably involve various parties which have their respective 
interests that need to be protected, however, such interests may be in conflict, as 
observed in the IMO Resolution and other writings such as the one by Eric Van 
Hooydonk.  And each party has its respective rights and obligations, under 
international or municipal law or both, either on public or private side.  On the other 
hand, minimizing the pollution damage can be viewed as a common goal of all 
parties, if preservation of the properties at risk is not another.  To find an effective 
and balanced way to achieve these goals, considerations shall be given to not only 
                                                 
8 Eric Van Hooydonk, ‘The obligation to offer a place of refuge to a ship in distress’, Lloyd’s 
Maritime And Commercial Law Quarterly, August 2004, at pp.347 – 374. 
9 Ibid. at p351. 
10 Ibid. at footnote 86. 
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the legal aspects, but also the ‘management problem’11.  Chapter 2 will start with a 
detailed examination of the requirements of international law, followed by analysis 
of salvage-related issues and decision-making problems in Chapter 3 & 4.     
                                                 
11 Aldo Chircop, ‘Ships in distress, environmental threats to Coastal States, and places of refuge: New 
directions for an ancient regime?’ Ocean Development and International Law, Vol. 33 (2002), pp. 
207-226. 
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CHAPTER 2    IN OR OUT – A POLITICAL DECISION 
 
 
The first question raised, when a ship is in distress, is whether it has the right to 
proceed to a place of refuge directly, or the entrance is subject to prior approval from 
the coastal State.  Such an intended place can be either within a port of the State, or 
in other sheltered place outside a port but still within the internal waters12 – such as 
an anchorage within a bay; it can also be a place outside the baseline, i.e. within the 
territorial sea.  Although some authors are of the opinion that, places outside internal 
waters are usually not sheltered enough to provide sufficient benefits to the ship in 
distress and are therefore hard to be regarded as places of refuge13, in salvage 
practice, a lot of operations can be done within the territorial sea such as connecting 
the tow line, inspection of the casualty and redelivery of the salved property.  Thus 
this chapter will discuss the right of access and the right of intervention in both of the 
maritime zones. 
 
2.1 Access to Ports and other Internal Waters –right of 
refusal with some exceptions 
 
Sovereignty of a State over its ports and other internal waters implies the absolute 
power of the State to regulate access to such territories14, unless such power is 
limited by international law, either treaties or customary law.  Indeed no international 
conventions can be found which expressly and directly impose the obligation of 
                                                 
12 Such is the approach taken in IMO Resolution A.949(23) – see Op.Cit. 6 at paragraph 1.19. 
13 Richard Shaw, ‘Places of Refuge – International Law in the Making?’ CMI Yearbook 2003, at p. 
330. 
14 Churchill, P.R. & Lowe, A.V., The Law of the Sea, 3rd ed. (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 1999) at p. 61.  See also I.A.Shearer (Editor), The International Law of the Sea, Volume II by 
D.P.O’Connell (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), at p 848. 
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admitting ships in distress on states15; but some other sources provide for exceptions 
to such an absolute power. 
 
One of the exceptions is the right of innocent passage in newly enclosed territorial 
waters (UNCLOS art. 8(2)).  States, at least member States of UNCLOS, cannot ban 
ships out of such waters simply for the reason of such waters being internal.  These 
areas are more akin to territorial seas than to internal waters, and will be included in 
section 2.2 in the discussion of innocent passage. 
 
Another exception is the right of ships to enter ports for the purpose of life saving.  
Such right has been supported by various cases, and has been clearly and generally 
recognized as amounting to the status of customary law16.  But the necessity of entry 
to preserve human life is the pre-requisite of such a right.  In other words, it is a 
‘limited right on humanitarian basis’, and ceases when dangers to life onboard are 
relieved.  States do have the obligations of life saving, not only under Search & 
Rescue Convention, but also out of customary law, however, admittance to port is 
not the only applicable method.  In present practice, crew and passengers onboard 
ships in distress are more often rescued by helicopters or life-saving crafts17, rather 
than carried onboard the ships in distress to a nearby port.  Even in the latter situation, 
the coastal State can still arrange for persons onboard to safely disembark the ship 
just outside the port, leaving the issue of places of refuge a purely separate and 
independent question. 
   
It seems that, other than the above two exceptions, research of the author found no 
persuasive evidence to prove that foreign ships in distress have the absolute right to 
enter the internal waters of a coastal state, which has removed all obstacles as to 
                                                 
15 Op.Cit.11 Aldo Chircop at p. 214, which points out that ‘The substantive law on the right of refuge 
is to be found in customary law, mostly evidenced through case law and the writings of authoritative 
jurists, and bilateral treaties.’ See also Op.Cit.8 Eric van Hooydonk at p 349, which referred to the 
theory of absolute right of entry as ‘an old rule of international customary law’. 
16 Op.Cit.14 Churchill & Lowe at p. 63. and O’Connell at pp. 853 – 858. 
17 Op.Cit.3 Aldo Chircop at p 34. 
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formation of customary international law, i.e. which has met the requirements of 
general state practice and opinio juris18.  An arbitration award, Saudi Arabia v. 
Aramco 195819, is sometimes cited to support the view that port entry is a customary 
right of foreign ships, but this award lacks both persuasive authorities and support of 
general state practices20.  The other authorities cited by supporters of the absolute 
right of entry, typically the Rebecca 192921, appear unable to extend the principle of 
right of entry further than under situations when life saving is concerned22.    
 
The fact that ships driven to port by force majeure enjoy certain degree of immunity 
is also referred to for this purpose23.  Indeed while no doubt can be cast on the 
established principle that ships in distress enjoy certain jurisdictional exemptions24, it 
is worthy asking whether such a principle can be extended to, or it implies a 
presumption, that port entry is a prerogative of ships in distress other than on 
humanitarian basis.  Historically the concern was on the ‘potential immunity’ rather 
than the right of entry25, and life saving at sea was not well-organized and effective 
                                                 
18 For general principles of customary international law see J.G.Starke, Introduction to International 
Law, 10th Ed., (Butterworth, 1989) Chapter 1.  See also Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public 
International Law, 6th Ed., (Oxford University Press, 2003) Chapter 1. 
19 27 ILR (1963), 117.   
20 Op.Cit.14 Churchill & Lowe at p. 61.  Notably even this decision recognized that ports can be 
closed ‘when the vital interests of the State so require’, (27 ILR(1967) 212); and some distinguished 
authors questioned whether the purported principle adopted by the Arbitrator in this case aims at 
forbidding ‘discrimination among foreign ships using ports’, see Op.Cit.13 O’Connell at p 848.  See 
also Op.Cit.11 Aldo Chircop at p. 210 that ‘[T]he dictum…is not good law’. 
21 Kate A. Hoff case (the Rebecca) (1929), IV RIAA 444.  See for instance Op.Cit.8 Eric Van 
Hooydonk at p 351 and its footnote 27; See also Op.Cit. 13 Richard Shaw at p. 330. Other cases 
confirming the right of access for life saving purpose include Creole (1853) Moore, Int. Arb. 4375. 
22 Churchill & Lowe at p. 63. 
23 Eric Van Hooydonk at p 350, and its footnote 24 & 25. Notably some of the authoritative writings 
quoted to support the absolute right of entry are actually limited to the immunity issue.  For instance, 
footnote 9 referred to D.P.O’Connell (Op.Cit.14) at pp353-358, which is actually the discussion of 
‘[T]he idea that ships forced by circumstances within the jurisdiction of other States are immune from 
its exercise’.  I. Brownlie (Op.Cit.18 at p 315) is quoted in footnote 10, however it is no more than a 
comment that ‘perhaps’ foreign ships entering ports as a consequence of distress are not subject to the 
jurisdiction of port states.   
24 See Op.Cit.11 Aldo Chircop at p. 210. for detailed discussion. 
25 Ibid. at p. 208. The limitation on this principle has been addressed by one of the Canadian cases, 
Cashin v. R., ([1935] Ex.C.R. 103, 64 C.C.C. 258, [1935] 4 D.L.R. 547), though such limitation is not 
related to the right of entry.  It reads, ‘It is a well-recognized principle, supported by the jurisprudence 
as well as by the opinions of authors on international law, that a ship, compelled through stress of 
weather, duress or other unavoidable cause to put into a foreign port, is, on ground of comity, exempt 
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as it is today.  Probably this explains the difficulty in finding in case law an 
authoritative consideration of port entrance independent of life saving. 
 
In the bi-lateral treaties regime, while on the one hand various bi-lateral treaties did 
have such an effect as to confer the right of entry on ships in distress26, on the other, 
it is questionable how widely were such treaties applied, and thus, to what degree 
had their provisions come close to the status of customary norms.  It could be further 
argued that, it was necessary to conclude such treaties exactly because there had not 
been such a pre-existing right – which was the ‘mischief’ that such treaties aimed to 
cure.        
 
Furthermore, even if the right of entry was the custom, it is difficult to argue that it is 
still a general state practice in present time27, as self-evidenced by the numerous 
cases where refusals were made – though whether such a practice is legitimate is 
another issue.   According to the two questionnaires carried out by CMI28, ‘[M]any 
responders anticipated that there could be a liability on a Government or Authority 
which acted negligently in declining a Place of Refuge’29.  It is a pity that no 
information is available which discloses the general state attitude toward the more 
direct question of whether Coastal States have such an obligation to offer places of 
refuge under existing international law; since, ‘negligence’ depends on a pre-existing 
duty of care, and the response does not help to clarify the extent of such a duty.   
 
Some states such as South Africa are viewed to have conferred the absolute right of 
port entry to all ships in their municipal law30, however, response by South Africa to 
                                                                                                                                          
from liability to the penalties or forfeiture which, had she entered the port voluntarily, she would have 
incurred.  The principle, however, should not be too widely interpreted.  It does not carry any right to 
the exemption from local laws, especially revenue laws.’ 
26 Ibid. at p.212. 
27 Eric van Hooydonk, at p 353. 
28 See CMI Yearbook 2002, pp. 117 – 146, and CMI Yearbook 2003, pp. 314 – 498. 
29 Ibid. CMI Yearbook 2003 at p 328. 
30 D.J. Devine, ‘The Cape’s False Bay: A Possible Haven for Ships in Distress’, South African 
Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 16, 1990/91 (Verloren van Themaat Centre for Public Law 
Studies, University of South Africa), at pp 83-84.  See also Stuart Hetherington, ‘Prestige – Can the 
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CMI’s questionnaire apparently does not support this view31.  The questionnaire also 
reveals that ‘very few’ countries have enacted domestic legislation with regard to the 
right of foreign ships in distress to seek shelter in ports or other internal waters, and 
China and Norway are among the few32.  While the domestic legislations of the two 
countries confer the privilege on such vessels to enter without prior application and 
approval, some restrictions are noteworthy.  For instance, China requires such 
vessels to ‘report immediately to competent Authorities’ and ‘obey orders’33 and 
Norway requires them to contact the authorities ‘by the fastest possible means’ ‘for 
specific instructions regarding anchoring or continued navigation’34.  Furthermore, 
the possibility that such vessels are required to leave the territory for whatsoever 
reasons is not excluded by such legislations. 
 
Two recent cases, The Long Lin35 and The Toledo36 have been viewed as having 
applied the doctrine that ‘[W]hen the interests or rights of the coastal states or the 
risk to which it is exposed are greater than those of the ship, access may be refused’37.  
The consideration in The Long Lin actually focuses on innocent passage and 
therefore will be discussed in the next section.   The ratio decidendi in The Toledo 
did subscribe to such a test of ‘potential harm greater than loss of ship and cargo’38, 
however, the author ventures to question whether there is such a requirement under 
international law.  The statement that ‘the benefit of a safe haven…is primarily 
humanitarian rather than economic’39 appears as a more accurate reflection of the 
current international law. 
 
                                                                                                                                          
law assist?’, CMI Yearbook 2003 at p. 363, which quotes from Derry Divine, ‘Ships in distress – a 
judicial contribution from South Africa’, Marine Policy Vol. 20 No. 3, 1996, pp. 229 – 234. 
31 Op.Cit.28 CMI Yearbook 2002 at p. 124.  
32 Ibid. pp. 127 - 129 
33 Maritime Traffic Safety Act 1983 (China), Article 11.  
34 See CMI Yearbook 2002 at p 129. 
35 The Long Lin [1995] Schip en schade 391, No. 95 (The Netherlands). 
36 ACT Shipping (OTE) Ltd. v. Minister for the Marine, Ireland and the Attorney-General (The MV 
Toledo), [1995] 2 ILRM 30. 
37 Op.Cit.8 Eric Van Hooydonk at p. 362. 
38 See Op.Cit.11 Aldo Chircop at pp. 215-216 for detailed discussion. 
39 Ibid.    
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Sovereignty being one of the most – if not the most - fundamental principles of 
international law, is not easy to ‘cut into’.  In fact, no international instruments have 
gone as far as to challenge that, whether or not to allow ships in distress to enter its 
ports or other internal waters is a decision to be made by the coastal State; on the 
contrary such was implied or recognized in, inter alia, 89 Salvage Convention (Art. 
9), IMO Guidelines (Resolution A. 949(23) paragraph 1.7), and EU Directive 
(2002/59/EC Art. 20).   
 
However, the right to make decision is not at all the same as to be right in refusing.  
The question of whether a refusal to shelter casualties is in breach of international 
obligations of the coastal State has been discussed by various authors, inter alia, as 
put forward by Richard Shaw in Designation of places of refuge and mechanism of 
decision making40: 
 
‘There appears therefore to be no general obligation in International Law on 
coastal states to designate places of refuge in their waters, but specific 
provisions in the European regional regime and international rules relating to 
oil pollution do contain general obligations which would necessarily involve 
such a requirement’. 
  
Such obligations are primarily the ones of environmental protection, and Section 2.3 
will go through these obligations in treaty, customary, and municipal laws, trying to 
determine whether a refusal or a grant of places of refuge and relevant intervention 
measures will make States accountable. 
   
2.2 Territorial Sea – Innocent Passage v. Intervention 
 
If ships seek shelter in places in the territorial sea, for instance, at an outer anchorage 
when the sea is relative calm, the situation is different from in the internal waters.   
 10
 Opinions have been raised that ‘the right of a coastal state to take action to protect its 
coastline from marine pollution is well established in international law’ and that 
‘[R]elevant provisions include: UNCLOS, Articles 194, 195, 198, 199, 211, 221, 
225’.41  However, it is doubtful whether such articles do have the effect as to confer 
or recognize such a right of the Coastal States.  Articles 195, 198 and 225 are clearly 
imposing duties on the State Parties, not conferring rights – the contents of these 
articles are self-explanatory.  Article 194 is also the same, as evidenced by the use of 
the words ‘States shall…’  Article 211 paragraph 4 does recognize the sovereign 
right of the coastal States, which reads ‘Coastal States may, in the exercise of their 
sovereignty within their territorial sea, adopt laws and regulations for the prevention, 
reduction and control of marine pollution from foreign vessels, including vessels 
exercising the right of innocent passage.’  However, it goes on to provide that ‘Such 
laws and regulations shall, in accordance with Part II, section 3, not hamper innocent 
passage of foreign vessels.’  This is consistent with the provisions of Article 24(a), 
which states that ‘the coastal State shall not impose requirements on foreign ships 
which have the practical effect of denying or impairing the right of innocent passage’.  
Article 221 is especially relevant, which states that ‘Nothing in this Part shall 
prejudice the right of States…to take and enforce measures beyond the territorial 
sea proportionate…’(emphasis added)  
 
Therefore the framework set by UNCLOS is apparently clear.  In the territorial sea 
Coastal States have sovereignty, subject to the right of innocent passage.  Coastal 
States’ right to intervene in its EEZ and on the high seas are explicitly recognized, 
but no specific provisions deal with intervention in the territorial sea; and in such a 
situation, prima facie the rule of ‘sovereignty subject to innocent passage’ is 
applicable.   
 
                                                                                                                                          
40 CMI Yearbook 2003 at p446. 
41 Efthimios E. Mitropoulos, ’Places of refuge’, BIMCO Review 2004, at p. 57. 
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It is then necessary to examine the test of ‘innocent passage’, to determine whether 
ships in distress still enjoy that right.  According to Article 18, ‘Passage means 
navigation through the territorial sea…’, and ‘Passage shall be continuous and 
expeditious.  However, passage includes stopping and anchoring, but only in so far 
as the same are incidental to ordinary navigation or are rendered necessary by force 
majeure or distress or for the purpose of rendering assistance to persons, ships or 
aircraft in danger or distress.’(emphasis added) 
 
A literal interpretation would suggest that ships in distress that have stopped and 
anchored are still in passage.  As for ships that are slow steaming, it seems they are 
also in the same position, since, literally the requirement of passage goes no further 
than that ‘to proceed with due speed under the circumstances, having regard to safety 
and other relevant factors’42.  But as for ships that have totally lost their power – 
which could frequently be the case, either as the cause or the symptom of the distress 
- the situation is not clear.  What if they are drifting, and what if they have been 
taken under tow? Some distinguished authors are of the view that stricken vessels are 
‘no longer in passage’ and ‘will thus be subject to the unfettered sovereignty of the 
coastal States.’43  Such a view was adopted in decision of The Long Lin44.  However, 
this view does not appear to be in compliance with the Convention – at least when 
ships in distress have managed to stop and/or anchor in the territorial sea they are 
still ‘in passage’, as unequivocally dictated by the Convention. 
 
As to whether ships in distress, especially ones that have already been leaking oil, are 
‘innocent’, the Convention provides no immediate and clear answer, either.  On the 
one hand, though it is not clear whether the list contained in art. 19 is an exhaustive 
one, the naming of wilful and serious pollution might imply the exclusion of 
                                                 
42 Center for Oceans Law and Policy (University of Virginia School of Law), United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982: A commentary, II (Dordrecht/Boston/London, 1993) at p 162.  
See also Eric Van Hooydonk at pp 351 - 352, footnote 35 & 37. 
43 Churchill & Lowe at p 353. 
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accidental pollution from the category of non-innocence45.  Also, accidental pollution 
per se does not seem to endanger the status of ‘innocence’ as long as it does not 
prejudice the ‘peace, good order, and security’ of the coastal states46, while the 
liability and remedy for pollution remains another matter. 
 
To give efficacy to such an article in its literal meaning, an explanation could 
probably be that, UNCLOS was so drafted to make a distinction under various 
situations.  If ships in distress are still capable of navigating, or if they can manage to 
stop and/or anchor, they are in passage; if they have completely lost power and are 
drifting, they are not.  As for a casualty that has been taken under tow, the whole 
convoy – the combination of tug and tow – could be considered as ‘a ship’ which 
continues to enjoy the right of innocent passage.  Though this explanation would 
probably lead to complexity, it seems reasonable, since situations other than drifting 
are more controllable, and thus imposing less threat to the environment.  
 
However, it is worthy of exploration into why statements have been made by 
authoritative jurists which are apparently contrary to the literal meaning of the 
Convention.  It is observed that the general view prior to 1978 was that ‘a stranded 
vessel disgorging oil would no longer be in passage, nor necessarily innocent’47.  
Though it is difficult to find further authoritative evidence in support of this remark, 
context of UNCLOS might suggest certain absurdity, which adds doubt to the true 
intention of Article 18.   
 
                                                                                                                                          
44 Op.Cit.35.  See also Op.Cit.30 Stuart Hetherington at p. 362; and Welmoed van der Velde, ‘The 
position of coastal states and casualty ships in international law’, CMI Yearbook 2003, pp.481-482, 
for more discussion. 
45 The implication of the term ‘include’ might vary according to different interpretation approaches.  It 
might be interpreted as an extension of the ordinary meaning and therefore does not have an exclusive 
effect; see Proshanto K. Mukherjee, Maritime Legislation, (WMU Publications, 2002) at p63.  
Alternatively, though subject to limited application, ‘the mention of one thing is the exclusion of 
another’, as dictated by the maxim of expressio unius; see Sir Rupert Cross, Statutory Interpretation, 
3rd Edition (London: Butterworths, 1995) at p 140. 
46 Churchill & Lowe at pp 81 – 87; see also Eric Van Hooydonk at p 358, and Op.Cit.44 Welmoed 
van der Velde, at pp.480-482. 
47 Op.Cit.1 Colin de la Rue at p 821. 
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If ships in distress and ships rendering assistance to them are in the status of innocent 
passage, as the case may be, then prima facie coastal states shall have no right to 
drive them out of the territorial sea; they might even be forbidden to adopt any laws 
or regulations or take any actions which hamper such right of innocent passage, as 
implied by Article 211.  This might then lead to a rather weird situation – that 
apparently the right of Coastal States to protect its own environment is greater in 
EEZ and on the High Seas than in its own territorial sea.   
 
Another important fact is that, in the drafting of the 69 Intervention Convention 
consideration was given to whether it should cover territorial seas as well, but 
eventually it was decided that it was not necessary, for otherwise it would narrow the 
sovereign rights of the coastal states, since oil leaking vessels were considered as not 
in the status of innocent passage48.  Probably drafters of UNCLOS, on the one hand 
have clarified and extended the definition of ‘innocent passage’, on the other, forgot 
to ‘patch up’ the part in relation to Coastal States’ right to take action in the 
territorial sea. 
 
The situation is rather confusing.  In the construction of a convention, ‘the literal 
meaning of the wordings in their context’ as well as the ‘object and purpose’ of the 
treaty are equally important49.  Is the literal meaning of Article 18 at variance with 
the intention of the State Parties?  Does it lead to manifest absurdity or repugnancy?     
 
If Article 18 is construed as depriving the right of innocent passage of ships in 
distress, then such ships are subject to the sovereignty and jurisdiction of the Coastal 
States.  If, otherwise, then it becomes necessary to determine whether there is such a 
rule in customary international law that, when factual or possible pollution from the 
                                                 
48 Ibid. at p 821. See also Op.Cit.14 O’Connell at p. 1007, which describes the situation prior to 1969 
as ‘[I]f the grounding occurs in its territorial waters, the coastal State may be presumed to have 
jurisdiction to take whatever measures are necessary to eliminate or reduce the risk of damage…But if 
the accident occurs on the high seas, such action could only be based upon residual notions of self-
defence and security…’ 
49 Vienna Convention on Law of Treaties, Article 31(1). 
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ships threatens the interests of the coastal State, the State has certain right to 
intervene in various maritime zones. 
 
UK’s action of ‘tow out and bomb’ in the Torrey Canyon incident has been viewed 
as justified by the principle of necessity50 or self-help51; while whether this was an 
established principle of customary international law is arguable, the subsequent  69 
Intervention Convention and UNCLOS Art. 221 have explicitly confirmed or 
conferred the right to intervene on State Parties.  As aptly phrased by Churchill & 
Lowe, ‘[T]he better view now is that the United Kingdom’s action against the Torrey 
Canyon in 1967, coupled with its ready acceptance by other States, constituted an 
emerging rule of customary international law which the Intervention Convention and 
the Law of the Sea Convention have clarified and crystallised.’52.  Though both 
conventions deal with interventions beyond the territorial sea only, it is persuasive 
that a fortiori states shall have the same right in the territorial seas, even though 
prima facie the principle established in UNCLOS is that exercise of sovereignty 
should be subject to the right of innocent passage.     
 
However, such measures, either pursuant to both Conventions, or according to the 
said customary rule of self-help, are required to be proportionate to the actual or 
threatened pollution and ‘shall not unnecessarily interfere with the rights and 
interests of the flag State, third States and of any persons, physical or corporate, 
concerned’. (Intervention Convention Art. V)  It has been generally recognized that, 
to find the standard of proportionate is a very difficult task.  Article V.3 stipulates 
that: 
‘In considering whether the measures taken are proportionate to the damage, 
account shall be taken of: 
                                                 
50 Patricia W. Birnie and Alan E. Boyle, International Law and the Environment (Clarendon Press , 
Oxford) at p. 379.  See also Op.Cit. 14 O’Connell at pp. 1006-1008. 
51 Op.Cit.22 D.J. Devine at p 85. For general principles of self-help as one of the remedies in law of 
tort, see W.V.H.Rogers, Winfield & Jolowicz on Tort, 16th ed., (Sweet & Maxwell London, 2002), at 
pp 794 – 796. 
52 Churchill & Lowe at p 355. 
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(a) the extent and probability of imminent damage if those measures are not 
taken; and 
(b) the likelihood of those measures being effective; and 
(c) the extent of damage which may be caused by such measures.’ 
 
This clause does not provide a precise formula to make decisions on balance of the 
respective extent and likelihood, and leave the question of ‘proportionate’ open to a 
flexible interpretation; in other words, it offers ‘too little hold for application in 
practice’53.  Indeed, amongst the conflicting interests – those of the ship and cargo 
owners, insurers, salvors, neighbouring countries and those of itself, it can be 
understandable that the decision-making state will rank its own interests above all 
others, and even if the actual amount saved is less than the total costs incurred on 
others, it is still not easy to conclude that such measures are not proportionate.  On 
the other hand, the extent and likelihood  of damage to the interests of various parties 
have been changed by the establishment of IOPC Fund as part of the international oil 
pollution liability and compensation framework as well as the article 14 of Salvage 
Convention and SCOPIC clause, as will be analysed in Chapter 4.  Interestingly, 
these vague words ‘shall take account of’ also appear in the 89 Salvage Convention 
as an obligation of State Parties, as will be seen in more details in Section 3.4.3.   
 
On the other hand, in determining whether an intervention measure is proportionate, 
consideration might have to be given to the purported fact that in the Torrey Canyon 
incident, it was when salvage had been ‘attempted as the first line of defence’ that 
UK took action54. And, the criteria of ‘proportionate’ might change over time, with 
the development of technology and salvage and oil spill response capabilities.  If the 
‘tow out and sink’ action of UK was a proportionate measure in 1969, it may not 
                                                 
53 Op.Cit.44 Welmoed van der Velde, at p. 489 
54 See THE TORREY CANYON, Report of the Committee of Scientists on the Scientific and 
Technological Aspects of the Torrey Canyon Disaster, HMSO, 1967. See also Colin de la Rue at p 
816. 
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necessarily be a proportionate one in present time55.  Deliberate scuttling of the ships 
in distress might violate the London Dumping Convention 197256; even the refusal to 
offer a place of refuge could be deemed as not appropriate in itself, if it is proved that, 
at the time of the occurrence, it could be reasonably foreseen that, effort to salve the 
ship and the cargo could have had led to a much better result than such a refusal.      
 
To summarise, whether ships in distress continue to enjoy the right of innocent 
passage in the territorial sea is confusing.  If they do not, prima facie coastal States 
can take actions against them by virtue of sovereignty; if they do, States can still take 
measures to protect the environment provided that such measures are proportionate.  
In both situations, considerations on other obligations of States cannot be excluded, 
typically the ones to protect and preserve marine environment. 
 
2.3 State Obligations in Environmental Protection 
 
Beyond doubt all states have certain obligations to protect the marine environment.  
To examine whether such obligations may override states’ right to refuse entrance of 
casualties and to take other forms of intervention, as questioned by Richard Shaw, it 
might be necessary to start with the doctrine of state responsibility. 
 
According to the prevailing doctrine of state responsibility, the breach of an 
international legal obligation per se will render the State liable, i.e. ‘wrongful intent 
or negligence of the individual whose conduct is ascribed to the State is not a 
                                                 
55 See Op.Cit.50 Patricia Birnie at p. 380. 
56 Apparently dumping include deliberate disposal of vessels at sea (Article III), which shall be 
prohibited by State Parties.  However whether a refusal to offer a place of refuge constitute deliberate 
disposal seems to be a confusing matter of fact rather than a matter of law – could it be reasonably 
foreseen that the refused casualty will sink, or could it be reasonably expected that it can proceed to a 
sheltered place within another jurisdiction?  It is noteworthy that the 1996 Protocol offers an 
exception ‘in emergencies posing an unacceptable threat to…the environment and admitting of no 
other feasible solution.’  On the one hand it has gone one step further in taking into consideration the 
environmental concerns, as compared with the 1972 Convention; on the other, will the words 
‘unacceptable’ and ‘feasible’ give rise to disputes when the Protocol enters into force?  See Op.Cit.3 
Aldo Chircop at pp.35-36 for more detailed discussion. 
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constituent element of international State responsibility’57.  As pointed out by 
Patricia Birnie, ‘“fault” is almost never the basis of responsibility in environmental 
disputes’58.  Brian D. Smith made a further analysis of the term ‘fault’ as that: ‘it is 
not subjective culpa but simply the fact of violation of international law that serves 
as the basis of a state’s responsibility’59.  Therefore it is necessary to examine the 
exact extent of such obligations, either in treaty or customary law.        
 
Part XII of UNCLOS deals with the obligations of States in environmental protection.  
Article 192 is a general statement that ‘States have the obligation to protect and 
preserve the marine environment.’  Art. 194 paragraph 1 goes on to provide that 
States shall take ‘all measures consistent with this Convention that are necessary to 
prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment from any source, 
using for this purpose the best practicable means at their disposal and in accordance 
with their capabilities’.  Typically relevant is paragraph 2 of article 194, which 
stipulates that: 
‘States shall take all measures necessary to ensure that activities under their 
jurisdiction or control are so conducted as not to cause damage by pollution 
to other States and their environment, and that pollution arising from 
incidents or activities under their jurisdiction or control does not spread 
beyond the areas where they exercise sovereign rights in accordance with this 
Convention.’ 
 
Article 195 contains States’ duty not to cause transboundary pollution in taking 
prevention and control measures.  
 
                                                 
57 Mohammed Bedjaoui(General Editor), International Law: Achievements and Prospects, (Paris: 
UNESCO, 1991), Chapter 17 International State Responsibility, by Eduardo Jimenez de Arechaga 
and Attila Tanzi, at pp 349 – 350. 
58 Patricia Birnie at p 142. 
59 Brian D. Smith, State Responsibility and the Marine Environment, (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1988), 
at p15. 
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Apparently these articles impose a heavy burden of duty on State Parties, and some 
authors are of the view that ‘this duty cannot be fulfilled without offering a place of 
refuge’60.  Indeed the provision of Article 194 has extended the ‘territorial conduct’ 
limit in state obligation as established in the Trail Smelter case, to state’s ‘own acts 
and private conduct in any locus over which it possess a measure of legal authority’61, 
and ‘the boundaries of the state’s capacity to take measures to prevent environment 
injury to another state will define the ambit of the obligation to take such measures’62.  
However, the apparently strict requirement of ‘all measures necessary’ has been 
moderated by the subsequent phrases ‘the best practical means at their disposal and 
in accordance with their capabilities’63.  In considering whether such an obligation 
will override the right of States to refuse to offer places of refuge, it seems that, only 
when admittance of the ship in distress is ‘the best practicable means…and in 
accordance with their capabilities’, will this article deprive such a right of refusal.  
Especially, when the substantial interests of the coastal State is under actual or 
threatened damage, i.e. the leaking oil from a casualty, it would be more difficult to 
convince that offering a place of refuge is the best practicable means.  Furthermore, 
ambiguity might exist in the interpretation of this article.  As observed by Brian 
Smith,  
“One might construe the term ‘necessary’, as opposed to ‘possible’ or 
‘reasonable’, as suggesting that failure to prevent strictly constitutes a 
violation of the obligation.  It is not inconsistent with this language, however, 
to overlay the ‘fault’ condition that responsibility will only arise in the event 
of an intentional or negligent failure to prevent.  The Convention deftly 
avoided confronting the ambiguity as to the standard of performance by 
providing only that states ‘shall be liable in accordance with international 
law.”64          
                                                 
60 Eric Van Hooydonk at p. 353 footnote 50. 
61 Op.Cit.59 Brian D. Smith at p 80. 
62 Ibid. at p 76 – 77. 
63 Patricia Birnie at p 352. 
64 Brain D. Smith at p. 118.  At footnote 47 it is further pointed out that ‘At least one proposal for 
express adoption of a strict standard was submitted to and rejected by the Conference.’ 
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The expression used by Article 195 that ‘States shall act so as not to’ might also give 
rise to uncertainties in the application of the doctrine of state responsibility.  Does it 
intend to give effect as that States will be liable when they intentionally, or 
negligently act to the contrary, or when they act with such an intention but fail?  If 
transformation into any forms of pollution is strictly prohibited, then how about in-
situ burning, the commonly seen oil spill response technique, which can (depending 
on the situation) be very effective in transforming a serious oil pollution into slight 
air pollution? 
 
Most significantly, the accurate extent of the obligations imposed by such UNCLOS 
articles must be examined in its context.  Article 221 states that ‘Nothing in this Part 
shall prejudice the right of States…to take and enforce measures beyond the 
territorial sea proportionate…’  Let alone the possible construction approach of 
‘latter clause overrides previous clause’, a plain interpretation would lead to the 
conclusion that, even if intervention measures are likely to cause damage to another 
state, the State still has the right to implement such measures provided that they are 
proportionate.  This principle is evidenced by the provisions of Intervention 
Convention, which by Article V paragraph 2 stipulates that ‘Such measures…shall 
not unnecessarily interfere with the rights and interests of…third States.’(emphasis 
added)  An implication can be drawn that, damage to the rights of third States is not 
strictly prohibited, as long as that such measures are necessary, i.e. proportionate, 
and a fortiori measures taken within Territorial Sea. 
 
Furthermore, as pointed out by some distinguished authors, some defences are 
available even when States are under strict liability, such as necessity65.  The doctrine 
of necessity is aptly summarized by Jimenez de Arechaga as66: 
‘…if a State, coerced by the necessity to save itself from greater and 
imminent danger which it has not itself induced, and which it cannot in any 
                                                 
65 Op.Cit.57 Eduardo Jimenez de Arechaga and Attila Tanzi, at pp 355 – 354.  See also Patricia Birnie 
at pp 142- 143. 
66 Ibid. Eduardo Jimenez de Arechaga and Attila Tanzi at p354. 
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other way escape, takes action violating a right of another State, such action 
does not engage its international responsibility.  But the danger it is to avoid 
must be of such a nature as “to put on jeopardy the existence of the State, its 
territorial or personal statute, its government or its form of government or to 
limit or even make disappear its independence or international capacity.”’ 
    
Though the doctrine of necessity does not directly offer a defence for States refusing 
to grant places of refuge, since protection of their own environment and economic 
interests does not meet the above standard, the author is of the view that, the legal 
thinking behind this doctrine shall be taken account of in the interpretation of 
relevant articles of UNCLOS.  It is probably not justifiable to interpret these articles 
as that, States are under strict obligation to take necessary measures to prevent 
damage to third States, even if such measures would cause greater damage to its own 
environment.  Though State Parties to UNCLOS have submitted themselves to be 
bound by the Convention – akin to a private contract, the true intention of the parties 
to the contract should be sought in its interpretation, while it is less likely that, 
prevention of damage to third States at the cost of greater damage to themselves is 
the true intention of Parties.  Such a lack of intention might probably be evidenced 
by the result of the aforementioned CMI questionnaire67. 
 
In further consideration of the obligations pursuant to these articles, what if the 
responding States were not aware of the necessity of such measures?  In other words, 
are States reasonably expected to have the good seamanship, and do current 
technology and information framework enable them, to determine what measures are 
necessary to achieve the end as stipulated in article 194, and enforce them 
accordingly?  Though according to the doctrine of state responsibility fault or 
negligence is not a necessary ingredient, it seems unfair to attribute liability to a state 
for its failure to take measure that neither it, or other states, could reasonably 
anticipated to be the necessary one at the time of the incident, even if in a later stage 
                                                 
67 CMI Yearbook 2003 at p 327-328. 
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it was discovered so.  Difficulties in such a task of determining the necessity of such 
measures will be discussed in more details in section 4.2. 
 
Similarly, one of the defences available to tort in common law jurisdiction, agony of 
the moment, might be necessary to be introduced for consideration of state 
responsibility in the context of place of refuge.  Since an individual will be 
exonerated when he did not respond properly in a time-critical emergency, isn’t it 
appropriate to offer such an exemption to states under similar situation, since the 
relation between states under international law is akin to such between individuals 
under municipal law?  States have certain obligations to be prepared for pollution 
incidents, however, the current requirement of international law – OPRC 
Convention68 and UNCLOS Article 19969 – is mainly the one to establish a 
contingency plan, and very few contingency plans contain provisions in relation to 
places of refuge70.  A more detailed example might be the found in the United States 
arrangement71.  Though as early as 1982 a National Research Council report entitled 
Marine Salvage in the United States has recommended the designation of safe havens 
and development of procedures and criteria for approval of their use, no USCG 
formal policies in this regard are available and the problem remains an ad hoc 
decision ‘on the basis of a complex set of factors’72.  The only exception may be in 
Prince William Sound, the regional policy of which provides for the captain of the 
port to designate safe havens when necessary73.   
 
                                                 
68 International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Co-operation, 1990, Article 
6. 
69 Which requires States to ‘jointly develop and promote contingency plans for responding to pollution 
incidents in the marine environment’. 
70 CMI Yearbook 2002 at pp. 120 – 121.  Of the responding countries to the first CMI questionnaire, 
only Australia, Denmark, Germany and New Zealand have adopted such provisions. 
71 USA is not a party to UNCLOS but a party to OPRC Convention. 
72 See Reassessment of the Marine Salvage Posture of the United States, by National Research 
Council, National Academy Press USA 1994, at pp 52 – 53. Though this report reveals situation no 
later than the year 1994 and no updated information has been published, up to present time no 
reference is made to the issue of safe havens in the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution 
Contingency Plan or in the U.S. Coast Guard Marine Safety Manual. 
73 Ibid. p53. 
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On the other hand, application of Articles 194 and 195 strictly in accordance with 
their literal meaning would lead to such a situation that, if an accident occurs beyond 
‘the jurisdiction and control’ of the State and the casualty never has a chance to cross 
the border, the State would be free of any responsibility; while, if the accidents 
occurs within such an area, the State would probably become liable for not taking the 
‘necessary measures’.  This might be the thinking behind some unilateral actions like 
the banning of single hull tankers – it has its reason, though whether it’s right or 
wrong is another story.  The author is of the view that, if such a failure results from 
the lack of capability of the State, for instance, lack of expertise or equipment, or, 
when awareness of such measures being necessary is not a general expectation, as we 
will see in the difficulties in the evaluation process, it seems not so fair to hold that 
State liable, especially when the State itself is a victim of the pollution.   
 
In order to get compensation pursuant to CLC/Fund Conventions State Parties may 
also have the duty of mitigation, as will be discussed in section 4.4.  However, such a 
duty is rather a test for entitlement of compensation, than a ‘public’ obligation 
towards the ship in distress and a third country. 
 
In the customary law regime, the most relevant might be the principle established in 
the Corfu Channel case, which requires each State ‘not to allow knowingly its 
territory to be used contrary to the rights of other States’74; and the one set by the 
Trail Smelter arbitration that ‘no State has the right to use or permit the use of its 
territory in such a manner as to cause injury…in or to the territory of another or the 
properties or persons therein, when the case is of serious consequence and the injury 
is established by clear and convincing evidence’75.  Some authors are of the opinion 
that these principles coupled with convention requirement would form a general rule 
that ‘[S]tates must not permit their nationals to discharge into the sea matter that 
could cause harm to the nationals of other States’76.  However, it is questionable 
                                                 
74 [1949] ICJ Rep. 3, at 22. 
75 III RIAA 1905, at 1965. 
76 Churchill & Lowe at p332. 
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whether it is safe to extend these principles as far as imposing an absolute liability on 
states to take any necessary measures to prevent environmental damage to third 
states, including offering a place of refuge.  In the Corfu Channel case, as precisely 
pointed out by Patricia W. Birnie, knowledge of the risk of harm was an essential 
condition77; while in the Trail Smelter case, the basis of responsibility was not 
considered at all but an assumed responsibility had been established in the 
compromise.78  Also the pollution originated from the territory of the defendant State 
and was directly caused by the daily operation of nationals of that State, which is 
obviously different from the situation under which the pollution was a result of an 
unintentional accident of a foreign ship, and that is the ‘territorial conduct’ 
prerequisite which Brian D. Smith views as having been overruled by UNCLOS, 
which establishes a higher standard of obligation79. 
 
It might be noteworthy that, the general obligation of environmental protection may 
also be a duty that a government owes to its nationals under municipal law.  As Lord 
Donaldson pointed out in the first sentence of his Review of Salvage and 
Intervention and their Command and Control, ‘[F]rom time immemorial the defence 
of the realm has been one of the principal responsibilities of “the Crown”, that is to 
say the government of the day’80.  Though the degree of such a duty might differ in 
various jurisdictions, the fact that international obligations are not the only whip over 
heads of States for environmental protection might offer an inspiration to find a 
practicable solution. 
 
2.4 Summary on State Obligations 
 
                                                 
77 Patricia Birnie at p143. 
78 Brian D. Smith at p 113. 
79 Ibid. at p. 80. 
80 Pub H.M.S.O. 1999 Cm. 4193, at p9. 
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As advised by CMI in one of its reports to IMO, ‘the present international regime is 
confused and unsatisfactory’81.  The safe view might be that, whether States have a 
strict liability to offer places of refuge when it is the necessary measure to prevent 
accidents within its jurisdiction and control to cause damage to third States is 
disputable under current international law regime, probably resulting from the crucial 
divergence in the interpretation of ‘innocent passage’. 
 
From a practical perspective, the incentive of the refusal is, as the past examples 
suggest, usually for the purpose of avoiding or reducing pollution to the coastline of 
the coastal State, and is subsequently followed by an order or an action to tow the 
ship in distress out, without which the refusal itself does not provide any benefits.  
Therefore the factors that States have to consider in relation to the intervention 
decision-making process will actually also have to be considered when deciding 
whether or not to grant a place of refuge.  Going squarely to the core of the Prestige 
accident, questions might be asked that, had Spanish Authorities foreseen such a 
catastrophic result, would they have had made such an order all the same?  And were 
they reasonably expected to have foreseen it?  Furthermore, how will the channelling 
of liability device established by CLC/Fund Conventions have influence on the 
obligation and responsibility regime as discussed in this Chapter?  Chapter 4 will 
deal with the conflicting interests, evaluation of intervention measures, and 
channelling of liability pursuant to CLC/FC Conventions in more details, after some 
discussion of salvage related issues in Chapter 3.   
                                                 
81 Supplementary Report on Places of Refuge, submitted by CMI to IMO on 11 February 2005, LEG 
90/8, at paragraph 26. 
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CHAPTER 3    SALVAGE AND COASTAL STATES 
 
 
3.1 The nature of salvage 
 
The difficulties to define salvage have once been expressed by an English judge as: 
‘It has been said that no exact definition of salvage is given in any of the 
books.  I do not know that it has, and I should be sorry to limit it by any 
definition now.’82 
 
Such difficulties are recognized by modern textbooks on salvage even of today83.  
Notably the 89 Salvage Convention offers no definition of ‘salvage’, but only that of 
‘salvage operation.’84  Indeed before discussion of the interrelationship between 
salvage and coastal states, it is quite necessary to look at the complex implication of 
the word salvage and its various categories. 
 
3.1.1 Salvage under traditional English law 
 
Though it may not be safe to say that English law is the blueprint of international law 
governing salvage today, it may be a true situation that no other jurisdictions contain 
such a huge bundle of salvage cases and principles as English law does, and some of 
                                                 
82 Lord Stowell in The Governor Raffles (1815) 2 Dods. 14, 17. 
83 See William Rann Kennedy & Francis Rose, Kennedy and Rose on Law of Salvage, 6th Edition, 
(London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2001), Chapter 1.  See also Geoffrey Brice & John Reeder (editor), Brice 
on the Law of Salvage, 4th Ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2003), paragraphs 1-77 to 1-81.   
84 Article 1 of 89 Salvage Convention: ‘For the purpose of this Convention – (a) Salvage operation 
means any act or activity undertaken to assist a vessel or any other property in danger in navigable 
waters or in any other waters whatsoever.’ 
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the major principles are obviously incorporated into the 89 Salvage Convention, 
though with some amendments to meet the requirement of the current situation. 
 
The law of salvage is a unique branch of law in English law, which will apply when 
certain standards are met, such as the principles of real danger, voluntariness, and 
success85.  Salvage is also used as a legal right, as envisaged in the use of the phrases 
‘claim salvage’, ‘be awarded salvage’.  In brief, the salvor must have assisted a ship 
in danger voluntarily, i.e. not out of his pre-existing obligations, and he must have 
obtained some degree of success in preserving the properties, even if a partial 
success, before he can be awarded with part of the value of the salved properties.  
The principle of success is also known as the ‘no cure - no pay’ rule. 
 
The traditional English law of salvage might be said to be in a declining status for 
two reasons.  First, the 89 Salvage Convention has been enacted by the UK and 
incorporated into its Merchant Shipping Act 1995(as substituted by the Merchant 
Shipping and Security Act 1997), and therefore has somehow replaced part of the 
traditional salvage law.  On the other hand, the emerging wide application of salvage 
agreement – typically the continuously renewed Lloyd’s Standard Salvage 
Agreement (more often referred to as the Lloyd’s Open Form or LOF) – has actually 
averted, if not overthrown, some old rules such as success and ‘no cure - no pay’.   
 
However, the importance of English law, no matter that of salvage or that of general 
private law, cannot be ignored, especially in salvage cases pursuant to LOF, since 
LOF salvage is subject to London arbitration and English law, as will be discussed in 
Chapter 4 in relation to salvor’s implied obligations.  
 
3.1.2 New implications under 89 Salvage Convention 
 
                                                 
85 For general principles of salvage see Op.Cit.83 Kennedy & Rose and Brice. 
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The 89 Salvage Convention is observed to aim at providing ‘a modernised and 
comprehensive restatement of the law of salvage’86.  On one hand, the principle of 
‘success’ and ‘no cure - no pay’, and criteria that are used in English law to 
determine salvage reward are coined into the Convention; while on the other hand, 
Article 14 of the Convention may be said to have made a most important innovation 
in international salvage law regime, though it was not an invention of the Convention 
but rather a device that had been long used by the industry.   In brief, it enables the 
salvors to recover their expenses when salvage operation has contributed to the 
actual or hopeful preservation of marine environment. 
 
Although it might not be accurate to say that the Convention has included operations 
for the purpose of environmental protection into the category of salvage87, it has at 
least changed the compensation / remuneration aspects of salvage operation.  How 
this, coupled with SCOPIC clause and Fund policy, has changed the salvors’ 
interests at risk in situations when places of refuge are concerned, will be discussed 
more in section 3.2. 
 
3.1.3 Private salvage v. compulsory salvage 
 
Although the word ‘compulsory salvage’ does not appear in the 89 Salvage 
Convention, the words ‘salvage operations by or under the control of public 
authorities’ clearly imply the recognition of such situations88.  It could be carried out 
by the authorities or other designated government agencies; or it could be done by a 
private entity or person, according to the order of public authorities.   
 
                                                 
86 Kennedy& Rose at p. 12. See also Brice at paragraphs. 1-78 to 1-79, and 6-88. 
87 The main debates in relation to the definition was whether ‘wrecks’ could be salvaged, as a 
deviation from traditional English law, see Frank Wall, Improvements and deficiencies from a 
government viewpoint, Salvage Conference Papers, (London: Lloyd’s of London Press, 1990), at p. 71. 
88 Article 5. 
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In English law of salvage though public officers rendering assistance services to 
ships in danger are also entitled salvage when such services are not within their pre-
existing obligations89, such officers are in the same position as private salvors, and 
no particular consideration have been given to its compulsory nature, i.e. a salvage 
operation in which the public authorities can actually have double characteristics: 
that of a private person claiming for compensation for the services he has provided, 
and that of a public officer giving orders on behalf of the State.   
 
As for the Convention, it only stipulates that the rights and remedies of such public 
authorities are subject to the national law of the State.  But the analysis of 
compulsory salvage is necessary since it is an important part of national accident 
response arrangements, and is deeply intertwined with other issues such as private 
salvors’ interests that are likely to be influenced by intervention measures.  Section 
3.3 will examine the prevailing practice and problems thereto. 
 
3.1.4 Contractual salvage – LOF v. Fixed rate services 
 
The Lloyd’s Standard Form of Salvage Agreement (more often referred to as 
‘Lloyd’s Open Form’ or LOF) has its long history in England and is the most 
commonly used salvage agreement of the type today90.  Statistics provided by 
International Salvage Union suggests that a total of 4,793 salvage operations were 
performed by its 52 members in the period 1978-2003, of which 2,588 operations 
were carried out under LOF91.   
 
In theory ‘no cure no pay’ is still the principle applicable to salvage pursuant to LOF; 
although the incorporation of Article 14 compensation and SCOPIC clause has 
                                                 
89 See Kennedy & Rose at pp. 533-557; see also Brice at paragraphs 1-211 to 1-261. 
90 See Lloyd’s Agency Salvage Arbitration Branch website, http://lloydsagency.com.  See also 
International Salvage Union website, http://www.marine-salvage.com . 
91 Ibid. International Salvage Union website. . 
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changed the actual economic income that salvors are likely to be entitled, as well as 
the pre-requisite of such an entitlement.   
 
Of course, LOF is not the only form of salvage agreement – there are various other 
forms of ‘no cure no pay’ agreement such as the Japan Shipping Exchange Form.   
On the other hand, let alone compulsory salvage, even private or commercial salvage 
operations are not always carried out pursuant to ‘no cure - no pay’ agreements.  For 
example, as pointed out by the USA National Research Council Report, salvage 
operations in US waters are more often subject to a negotiated or day rate, and such 
services are sometimes provided by the so-called ‘independent salvors’ or ‘general 
marine contractors’92, whose work scope will be limited to a specific aspect of the 
whole salvage operation such as fire-fighting or emergency towing or simply 
consultation, vis-a-vis the overall ‘one package’ services provided by a ‘full-time 
professional salvor’93. 
 
Interesting to note, linguistic differences might give rise to different appreciation of 
the concept of salvage.  For instance, in Chinese the word ‘salvage’ is sometimes 
used interchangeably with ‘rescue’ – a typical example can be found in the Chinese 
version of the 89 Salvage Convention and the 79 SAR Convention, in which the 
same Chinese word ‘Jiuzhu’ is used for both salvage and rescue.  For a quite long 
period of time in recent history a word similar to ‘wreck-removal’ or ‘refloating’ 
(pronounced ‘Dalao’) has been used to specifically refer to what salvage means in 
English law, and it is only recently that another phrase ‘property salvage’ has been 
used in official document, vis-a-vis what can be literally translated as ‘life salvage’.     
 
                                                 
92 Op.Cit.51 Reassessment of the Marine Salvage Posture of the United States, at p 16 & p 24. 
93 It’s rather irrelevant but just interesting to mention that, a muddled situation may therefore be 
created: should these fixed-rate assistance services be included in the ‘salvage operations’ over which 
the 89 Salvage Convention is applicable?  It might not be a serious problem in common law 
jurisdictions with the full set of principles especially voluntariness related to salvage: however, in a 
civil law jurisdiction where the 89 Convention is applicable without relevant national law restrictions, 
it is still quite disputable whether salvors under such agreements can claim salvage reward and 
compensation according to the Convention.   
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The word salvage might have different meanings according to different people or in 
different circumstances.  The apprehension of English judges and lawyers might be 
the ‘purest’ or narrowest one; while the ‘salvage operation’ under 89 Convention has 
a much wider implication – a literal interpretation would include any assistance 
provided to vessels in danger, no matter on a compulsory or a fixed-rate basis.  In the 
context of accident and pollution response, it is necessary to consider salvage in its 
widest implication, since all these kinds of salvage have a clear public effect – 
prevention or control of pollution, or, in very rare cases, causing deterioration on the 
contrary. 
 
3.2 Private salvors’ interests that might be influenced 
 
In carrying out the salvage operation, salvors would have to invest certain equipment 
and human resources, and in dangerous situation – which is not an uncommon scene 
in salvage – would have to take the risks of their own property or even human safety, 
in order to salve other’s property and protect the environment.  In return it is only 
justifiable that they be remunerated for the expenses, efforts and courage they have 
invested.   Such a legal thinking is not only effected in the English salvage law and 
89 Convention, but is also in conformity with the ‘unjust enrichment’ theory of civil 
law systems.  The framework to determine remuneration has evolved greatly over the 
last decade, into today’s ‘three-tier’ arrangements, briefly speaking, the Article 13 
reward, Article 14 special compensation, and the SCOPIC compensation94, which 
represent the recognition of the international society to provide adequate incentives 
to professional salvors. 
 
3.2.1 No cure - no pay and Art. 13 Reward 
 
                                                                                                                                          
 
94 For detailed discussion of remuneration for salvage services see Xu Jing Jing, Assessment of 
salvage award under Lloyd’s Open Form, World Maritime University Dissertation (2000). 
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Success is one of the criteria that are required to be met in order to be entitled 
salvage under English law.  The principle is also known as ‘no cure no pay’, which is 
incorporated in article 12 of the 89 Salvage Convention, which reads ‘Salvage 
operation which have had a useful result give right to a reward’, and ‘except as 
otherwise provided, no payment is due under this Convention if the salvage 
operations have had no useful result’.   Then the salvors’ reward will be determined 
according to article 13 of the Salvage Convention. Usually it will be a percentage of 
the value of the salved property, the percentage depending on various factors such as 
the skills and efforts exercised by the salvors and the degree of danger etc. 
 
The 89 Convention does not provide for the definition of ‘useful result’, though in 
English law there are numerous cases providing interpretation for ‘success’95.  LOF 
provides for a more detailed arrangement, under which the salvor shall take the 
salved property to an agreed place of safety, or in case of lack of agreement, to a 
place of safety, before the salvage can be deemed success96.  As aforementioned, 
LOF is governed by English law, and the requirement for ‘place of safety’ under 
English law will have to be met. 
 
It will be in vain to investigate the exact interpretation of ‘useful result’ in various 
jurisdictions, however, briefly salvors would not only have to salve the casualties 
from the danger it has been threatened, but also have to bring them to a status where 
they are no longer threatened by, at least, the same danger, in order to be entitled 
Article 13 reward.  In cases where a coastal state refuses to allow a casualty to enter 
into a certain place, no matter such a place is intended as a temporary location to 
carry out salvage operation or is for redelivery of the salved property, salvors would 
probably lose the chance of getting a useful result and thus would lose the chance of 
getting Article 13 reward. 
 
                                                 
95 See Kennedy & Rose Chapter 8, and Brice paragraphs 1-348 to 1-352. 
96 See LOF 2000 Articles A and H. 
 32
3.2.2 Article 14 special compensation 
 
Though Article 14 is not an invention by 89 Salvage Convention, it may be said to be 
the most important innovation in international salvage law regime, which provides: 
 
‘Article 14 Special Compensation 
1. If the salvor has carried out salvage operation in respect of a vessel which 
by itself or its cargo threatened damage to the environment and has failed 
to earn a reward under article 13 at least equivalent to the special 
compensation assessable in accordance with this article, he shall be 
entitled to special compensation form the owners of that vessel equivalent 
to his expenses as herein defined. 
2. If, in the circumstances set out in paragraph 1, the salvor by his salvage 
operation has prevented or minimized damage to the environment, the 
special compensation payable by the owner to the salvor under paragraph 
1 may be increased up to a maximum of 30% of the expenses incurred by 
the salvor.  However, the tribunal, if it deems it fair and just to do so and 
bearing in mind the relevant criteria set out in article 13, paragraph 1, may 
increase such special compensation further, but in no event shall the total 
increase be more than 100% of the expenses incurred by the salvor.’ 
 
This article can be said to be a major manifestation of the main purpose of the 89 
Convention, i.e. to offer adequate incentives to persons who undertake salvage 
operations, and therefore to encourage private efforts for environmental protection.  
Indeed with the growth of oil transport at sea, the increasing number of bigger and 
bigger tankers, and thus inevitably, the increased number of major oil spills, the old 
rule of ‘no cure – no pay’ seemed no longer an adequate motivating mechanism.  If 
salvors spend great effort and expenses but have to face a greater risk of failing to get 
adequate compensation, which proved to be the factual result in several cases in the 
1970’s and 80’s, it is not surprising that salvors were reluctant to take the job of 
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salving laden tankers in distress.  This is quite adverse to the increasing concern of 
the coastal states to protect the marine environment, and the increased liability of 
shipowners and their P&I clubs after the CLC Convention entered into force.  The 
Article 14 arrangement, originated from the previous private ‘safety net’ arrangement, 
when established through an international convention, reflects the general 
international attitude which recognized that, it is only adequate that salvors should at 
least be able to recover their costs for their efforts to preserve the marine 
environment, and they should be awarded economic bonus when their efforts have 
some useful result in this aspect, even when there is no useful result in preserving the 
marine property at risk97. 
 
3.2.3 SCOPIC 
 
When in The Nagasaki Spirit (1997)98, the English House of Lords made a judgment 
unfavourable to the salvors in determining the ‘fair rate’ in Article 14, concerns were 
again raised as to whether the current remuneration systems for salvors were 
adequate enough.  As a compromise of the P&I clubs, SCOPIC clause was added to 
the LOF agreement.  In brief, parties when fixing the LOF will have a discretion to 
incorporate the SCOPIC Clause, and afterwards till the end of the salvage operation, 
salvors can elect to invoke the incorporated SCOPIC Clause.  The appendix to this 
clause contains a list of fixed day rate for various salvage equipment and personnel, 
and once it is invoked, special compensation under Article 14 will be replaced by 
calculation of the inputs and expenses according to this fixed rate99. 
 
                                                 
97 See Kennedy & Rose Chapter 5, and Brice Chapter 6.  See also Thomas A.Mensah, Deficiencies 
found in the Regime Established under the 1910 Salvage Convention, and Michael J.lacey, Expansion 
of the Salvage Industry to meet Modern Requirements and the Need for Substantial Rewards to 
Sustain the Industry, Salvage Conference Papers, (London: Lloyd’s of London Press, 1990), at pp.1-
10 and 11-24 respectively. 
98 Semco Salvage and Marine Pte. Ltd. v. lancer Navigation Co. Ltd. (The NAGASAKI SPIRIT) [1997] 
1 Lloyd’s Rep. 323 (H.L.) 
99 See Kennedy & Rose Chapter 5 & 9, and Brice Chapter 8 for more detailed discussion. 
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3.2.4 Maritime Lien and Ship Arrest 
 
The words ‘to be entitled salvage’ have implications of not only the right to be given 
a certain amount of remuneration, but also the right to enforce such a remuneration.  
Salvage is a traditional maritime lien and has high priority over various other 
maritime claims.  According to Article 5.2 of the International Convention on 
Maritime Lien and Mortgage 1993, ‘maritime liens securing claims for reward for 
the salvage of the vessel shall take priority over all other maritime liens which have 
attached to the vessel prior to the time when the operations giving rise to the said 
liens were performed’, and maritime liens rank above all other general claims but for 
some exceptions (Art. 5.1, 12.3 & 12.4)  The similar provisions are also contained in 
the Convention Relating to Maritime Liens & Mortgage, 1967.  The International 
Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules relating to the Arrest of Seagoing 
Ships, 1952, by Article 1.1.c and Article 3, recognizes the right of salvors to arrest 
the particular ship as well as the sister ships to enforce salvage claims100.   
 
None of the above conventions, nor the 89 Salvage Convention, deal with the 
question of whether claims pursuant to Article 14 would fall within the category of 
‘salvage reward’ or ‘maritime liens’.  Instead Article 20 of the 89 Convention 
stipulates that ‘nothing in this Convention shall effect the salvor’s maritime lien 
under any international convention or national law’.  The 93 Lien Convention, by 
Article 4, only names ‘claims for reward for the salvage of the vessel’ as maritime 
liens.  It is also not clear whether Article 14 claims can be enforced through arrest of 
ships.  The 52 Arrest Convention simply reads ‘a claim arising out of … salvage’ 
(Art. 1.1). 
 
                                                 
100 See David C. Jackson, Enforcement of Maritime Claims, 3rd Ed. (London; Hong Kong: LLP 2000), 
at paragraph 18.43-44 & 18.66-69; Francesco Berlingieri, Berlingieri on Arrest of Ships – a 
commentary on the 1952 and 1999 Arrest Conventions, 3rd Ed. (London; Hong Kong: LLP, 2000), at 
paragraphs I. 438 – 441; Op.Cit. 83 Brice at paragraph 2-12. 
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As aforementioned, definition of salvage is divergent.  The prevailing view is that, 
special compensation under Article 14 does not give rise to a maritime lien, since the 
legal thinking behind the salvage lien is that, by a successful salvage operation some 
properties are preserved which create a basis for claim enforcement.  In other words, 
salved properties provide some tangible securities, by the arrest of which, the 
salvors’ claims can be secured.  Furthermore, in 89 Salvage Convention the word 
‘reward’ is specifically used to refer to Article 13 reward, and Article 14 uses the 
words ‘special compensation’ instead.  Therefore it is more persuasive than not, that 
salvors cannot exercise maritime liens against salved properties for Article 14 
compensation101. 
 
As further evidence, Article 4.7 of Lloyd’s Standard Salvage and Arbitration Clauses 
(which is an integrated part of the LOF Agreement) provides that ‘…the Contractors 
shall have a maritime lien on the property salved for their remuneration’, while 
article I of LOF 2000 which reads ‘The Contractors remuneration and/or special 
compensation…’, implies that special compensation is not part of the 
‘remuneration’102. 
 
As for the right to arrest, typically the right to arrest sister ships when the particular 
ship in distress is in total loss, a literal interpretation of the relevant provisions in the 
52 Arrest Convention seems to approve this right103, since it is, apparently, a claim 
‘arising out of salvage’104.   
 
                                                 
101 See William Tetley & Robert C. Wilkins, Maritime Liens and Claims, 2nd Ed. (Montreal; Quebec: 
Editions Y. Blais, 1998), at pp. 342 – 345. 
102 See Brice at paragraphs 8-69 to 8-74. 
103 See Op.Cit.101 William Tetley at pp. 337 – 381. 
104 Notably the 99 Arrest Convention (not in force yet) by Article 1.1.(c) expressly include special 
compensation in the definition of ‘maritime claims’.  The Salvage Convention by Article 21 titled 
‘duty to provide security’, has the effect of conferring a right of ‘quasi possessory lien’ on salvors, 
however, it applied to the salved property only and does not apply to sister ships. See Ibid. at p 363, 
Op.Cit.100 David C. Jackson at Chapter 20 (particularly section 20.49), Op.Cit.83 Brice at paragraph 
2-76 and Kennedy & Rose at section 13.2, for detailed discussion. 
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3.2.5 Salvage as commercial activities 
 
In history salvage used to be an occasional activity; as we can read from the great 
amount of cases in English law since the 16th century, the circumstances are often 
that a ship or a person in the vicinity of a ship in distress ‘gave a hand’ to the 
casualty and was subsequently awarded salvage.  Such is not at all the situation of 
today.  Development of technology has resulted in larger size and more complex 
construction and equipment of ships, thus requiring a much higher standard on the 
salvage expertise and equipment.  Salvage are dominantly carried out by 
professionals, and often pursuant to an agreement, no matter a ‘no cure no pay’ form 
or on the basis of a fixed rate.  In essence, salvage carried out by private entities is a 
commercial service in its nature. 
 
However, the possible accusation that salvors make money out of accidents is a very 
unfair one.  No matter how professional a salvor is, the risk that he has to take with 
regard to his own property or even safety of life still exists even with the most 
updated technology available.  On the other hand, it might not be a well-known fact 
that, it is very expensive to maintain salvage equipment and personnel capable of 
handling major accidents.  Even for ‘full-time professional’ salvors who provide ‘one 
package’ salvage services, the income from salvage is far less than sufficient to cover 
the cost of maintaining such equipment and personnel.  To be capable to handle 
major accidents, powerful tugs with fire-fighting equipment is of necessity; so is an 
experienced and well-trained team105.  Other special craft or equipment such as a 
floating crane is sometimes needed.  From the very beginning of the emergence of 
professional salvors, salvage is not the regular source of income that he can depend 
on.  Such salvage vessels must be operated for ‘normal’ commercial purpose, such as 
harbour and ocean towing and offshore services, to keep the company survive, while 
salvage income is deemed as a bonus.  Such a situation has been commented by a 
                                                 
105 For general information on salvage methods, equipment and techniques see IMO Manual On Oil 
Pollution, Section III, Salvage (1997 Edition), (London: IMO Publication, 1997), Appendix 1.  See 
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salvage master with humour as one of ‘bread and butter’ – the normal activity is the 
bread and salvage is the butter106.  
 
3.3 Salvage operations carried out or controlled by 
authorities 
 
Three articles contained in the 89 Salvage Convention are relevant to this issue, 
namely, Articles 5, 9, and 11. 
3.3.1 Authorities’ Right to Salvage 
 
Though Article 5 is viewed by some distinguished authors as ‘clumsy’107, the 
necessity for such a provision is obvious, as it clarifies the right of public authorities 
to carry out salvage operations and to claim reward and/or compensation thereof.  
Under English law ‘voluntariness’ is another testing for entitlement of salvage, i.e. 
salvors will not be entitled salvage if his services were carried out pursuant to a pre-
existing obligation, such as the obligation of a public authority to assist.  No matter 
to what degree this provision has changed the situation in English law, if at all, at 
least it has taken ‘particular account of the fact that different States may have 
different rules for public authorities which carry out salvage operations’108.   
 
3.3.2 Salvage as part of national response framework 
 
To carry out salvage operation can be not only the right, but also the obligation of a 
public authority or government agency.  Such pre-existing obligation does not 
prejudice the right of such entities to claim for remuneration provided that the 
national law allows so, as confirmed in the 89 Convention. 
                                                                                                                                          
also C. Baptist, Salvage Operations, (London: Stanford Maritime, 1979), and Edward M. Brady, 
Marine Salvage Operations, (Cambridge: Cornell Maritime Press, 1960). 
106 Ibid. C. Baptist. 
107 Kennedy & Rose at p. 546. 
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 The participation of vessels owned or operated by states or public authorities is not a 
rare scene in reality.  Typical might be the national salvage system of China.  The 
Salvage Bureaus under the Ministry of Communication of China (namely the China 
Salvage as co-ordination centre, and Guangzhou Salvage, Shanghai Salvage and 
Yantai Salvage as local operators) are state owned and state operated government 
agencies.  They undertake various duties conferred by the Chinese Government, 
including accident response, property salvage, wreck removal as well as oil spill 
cleanup in Chinese territorial sea and internal waters109; and they also perform 
obligations under international conventions and bilateral agreements on behalf of 
China.  Though the Commercial Maritime Code of China does not specifically deal 
with the issue of whether public authorities can be entitled salvage, one of the 
Decrees given by Ministry of Communication (which in Chinese legal system have 
the status of legislations) specifically confers the right of claim for salvage 
remuneration on these organizations.  Another MOC Decree (No 426 dated 22nd July 
1997) stipulates that ‘…For the salvage of foreign ships, the gross tonnage of which 
is above 300 tons, and the properties onboard, the salvage Bureaus of MoC shall 
organise professional salvage teams and relevant forces in providing relief…’  China 
Salvage is one of the members of ISU and, apart from other numerous salvage 
operations, the local salvage organizations have successfully fulfilled several LOF 
salvage and were awarded accordingly.           
 
China is not, of course, the only example.  Though U.S.A. by OPA 90 requires vessel 
operators to certify that adequate salvage capability is available110, it maintains a 
salvage response capability, mainly with the Coast Guard and the Navy.  Though the 
policy is that such resources ‘are made available for commercial use only when 
commercial assets are not available’, and ‘has participated in commercial salvage 
                                                                                                                                          
108 Ibid. at p. 547. 
109 Search and rescue used to be among the political duties of these organizations until an 
organizational reform in 2003 which separated each of the three local agencies into two organizations, 
responsible for salvage and rescue respectively. 
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only as a salvor of last resort’111, such a policy does not necessarily apply when the 
purpose of the salvage is to prevent or minimize pollution112.  Cases can be named 
such as the Mega Borg and the Ocean 255113.  Interesting to note, a LOF was entered 
into for salving the Mega Borg, but case report could be found in the Lloyd’s 
Salvage Arbitration Branch website, though generally a LOF in act will be reported 
and published in this way.    
 
In Europe, a Maritime Safety Proposals by Baltic countries in 2004 proposed 
permanent provision of emergency tugs along main shipping routes114.  Though it is 
not clear how many European countries have actually arranged salvage tugs along 
their coastal lines as one of the accident response systems, the question of whether 
services provided by such tugs should be compulsory would inevitably be raised 
when they have been actually put in station.  South Africa has already had such an 
arrangement in place.  A powerful towing tug is standby on duty all year round near 
the Cape of Good Hope.  It is private owned and chartered in by the Authorities, and 
when there is an accident, a salvage agreement will be concluded between the tug 
owners and the casualty owners115.     
 
The necessity to maintain government funded salvage capabilities partly results from 
the business environment and practices of the salvage industry.  Private salvors will 
not normally distribute expensive tugs and equipment along the coasts, waiting for 
accidents and salvage agreement; if so, it would make them bankrupt.  And they have 
no obligations to do so.  To better protect the environment and the public interests, 
two alternative approaches are available.  One is the approach taken by the 89 
Salvage Convention, to encourage private salvors; the other is to maintain national 
                                                                                                                                          
110 33 CFR 155.1035 
111 Op.Cit.72 Reassessment of the Marine Salvage Posture of the United States, at p 14. 
112 Ibid. at p.31. 
113 Ibid. at pp. 29, 96, & 97. 
114 Maritime Safety Proposals Baltic 2004, Maritime Safety Conference Baltic December 2004, inter 
alia,  Annex to Proposal No. 1, Section 5. 
115 As advised by Captain Brian Watt, Chief Director of Maritime Administration of South Africa, in a 
WMU seminar in year 2004. 
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salvage capabilities, subject to the fiscal situation of that State.  Various concerns 
have been expressed as to whether it is appropriate to rely solely on private salvage 
capabilities; for countries which are not parties to the Fund Convention, the 
maintenance of public-funded national salvage team appears more important.          
 
It must be noted that, going back to the Prestige accident, an article comments that 
‘The maritime rescue ships belonging to the Xunta de Galicia116 (the towing boat 
“Valdivia” and the supporting ship “Serra de Santiago”) could not operate due to 
their obsoleteness and their technical incapability for this kind of actions’117, and 
points out the lack of protection to the coastlines.  The comment is not accurate for 
that the registered owner of the two tugs is Remolcadores Nosa Terra S.A. (Spain), a 
private professional salvage company, not the government118.  Two larger tugs 
belonging to the same company, the Ria de Vigo(120T BP) and Charuca Silveria 
(50T BP) were in the vicinity from a very early stage; one was on scene and the other 
was approaching under a pending agreement, while a LOF had been awarded to 
another professional salvor119.  It is not certain whether the two smaller tugs were 
charterered by the government as part of the standby salvage capabilities, but the 
facts relating to the accident would suggest that lack of salvage capabilities was not a 
contributing factor to the severe final result.    
 
3.3.3 Protection of National Salvage Industries 
 
While article 5 of 89 Salvage Convention clarifies the right of public authorities to 
claim for salvage remunerations provided that the national law permits so, it does not 
                                                 
116 The regional government of Spain which was mainly involved in the initial response to the 
accident. 
117 Proposal for maritime transport, by Nunca Mais.  See Coordination Marée Noire website, 
http://www.coordmareenoire.net/article.php3?id_article=150 
118 See website of the company, http://www.remolcanosa.com/en, and Fairplay World Shipping 
Encyclopedia.  
119 See Lloyd’s Agency website, Salvage cases report, https://www.lloydsagency.com/Agency/ 
Salvage.nsf/vwSalvageCases/952F3D178BA3850580256C7E00573320?OpenDocument, reported by 
Smit Salvage B.V. on November 13, 2002. 
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deal with the question of whether States have the right to  ‘reserve’ the salvage 
business for themselves or for national salvors.   
 
For compulsory salvage carried out by public authorities or government agencies for 
the purpose of pollution prevention or reduction, the answer tends to be a 
confirmative one, since the right of the State to promulgate and enforce laws in its 
territorial sea, especially those related to environmental protection, is well 
recognized. 
 
But for commercial salvage, the issue is a little more complicated.  Though it has 
been generally recognized that salvage is by its nature a commercial service120, at 
least in present time when professional salvage has become the main stream, there is 
no international agreements, not even the WTO instrument, which deal with the 
market entry permit of the salvage industry.   
 
Then does a state have an international obligation to allow salvage in its territorial 
sea to be carried out by foreign salvors?  No restriction is imposed in the 89 
Convention - though Article 11 might be relevant it hardly contains any substantial 
requirement.  It might be argued that the definition of innocent passage in UNCLOS 
would imply the right of foreign salvors to carry out salvage in the territorial sea, 
since ships stopping to render assistance are considered to be in the status of innocent 
passage121.  However, ships in innocent passage will lose the status of innocence if 
its activities are contrary to the national laws, provided that such laws are not 
contrary to the international law.  Allowing certain activities within one jurisdiction 
does not necessarily imply allowing foreign legal persons to gain economic income 
from such activities.  For example, foreigners are of course allowed to sing and 
dance, but they are not necessarily allowed to perform entertainment shows and 
generate income therein.    
                                                 
120 Op.Cit.3 Aldo Chircop, at p39.   
121 Article 18.2. 
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 The complexity of the question might have its root in the complexity of salvage.  In 
some circumstances, for instance, when a small ship encounters some engine 
problem in the vicinity to shore, and a passing-by cargo ship can easily connect a tow 
lint to her and tow her to an anchorage, this operation is a kind of salvage and it 
seems unreasonable for the national law to request the small ship in distress to wait 
for national salvors.     
 
Marine salvage is unique in its public implication, which is akin to firefighting on 
land.  Such a public implication is more and more manifest with the growing concern 
on environmental protection.  At least, it is justifiable for States to regulate salvage 
activities within its territorial sea, and such a regulation can include the pre-
qualification of salvors.  To examine the capabilities of national salvors and 
certificate them can be one of the measures that a government adopts, to familiarize 
itself with its accident response capability, and to facilitate such private assets for the 
public interests when necessary.  Instead of foreign salvors, whose qualification the 
Authority might have no clue at all, why should the State be required to refrain from 
reserving the business for national salvors only, especially when the State is 
confident on the sufficiency of its national salvage capabilities?  Local salvors might 
have some advantage compared to a foreign salvor, for instance, they might be more 
familiar with the hydrology at site and more skilled in communication.   
 
Aside from the public administration purpose, States shall have the right to favour its 
national salvors simply for the purpose of preventing national salvors from outside 
competitors, as an incentive provided to national salvage industry.  At least, there is 
no international instrument under which a coastal State consents to waive this right.    
The only clear exception might, again, be where life saving is concerned, in which 
situation it is not only a right but also an obligation of the ships nearby to assist the 
ship in distress.   
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As a generally recognized principle in international law, a state has permanent 
sovereignty over its natural resources and internal economic activities, and such a 
principle is reinforced in the Charter of the United Nations (General Assembly 
Resolution 2625 XXV (e)) which reads122: 
‘Each State has the right freely to choose and develop its political, social, 
economic and cultural systems.’ 
 
And article 2, paragraph 1 of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States: 
‘Every State has and shall freely exercise full permanent sovereignty, 
including possession, use and disposal, over all its wealth, natural resources 
and economic activities.’ 
 
United States, one of the countries well known for its free market doctrine, actually 
‘restricts the activities of foreign tugs and salvage vessels in U.S. navigable 
waters’123.  Foreign salvage vessels cannot work in coastal waters of the United 
States unless approval of a high customs official is granted.  Interesting, Vietnam 
used the fact that two salvage operations were carried out by its nationals in history 
to support its territorial claims124. 
 
Not surprisingly commercial salvage is not on the negotiation table of WTO member 
States; it does not even seem to fit within any of the categories of WTO Service 
Sectoral Classification List125.  Apparently the issue has not raised concern of the 
maritime sectors, either, not even in the drafting of the 89 Salvage Convention.  The 
Convention was a response to the shrinkage salvage industry and ‘declining salvage 
                                                 
122 Op.Cit.57, Chapter 27, Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources and Economic Activities, 
by Georges Abi-Saab. 
123 Cabotage Law (Act of 11 June 1940) 46 USC 316. 
124 WMU Dissertation 2003, Jean Ver Pugal Pia, “Conflicting Territorial Claims in the South China 
Sea”, at p30, which quotes from Gerardo Martin C. Valero, “Spratly Archepelago: Is the question of 
sovereignty still relevant? A roundtable discussion”, Quezon City, Philippines: Institute of 
International Legal Studies University of the Philippines Law Center, 1993, pp 17-18. 
125 See WTO website, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/mtn_gns_w_120_e.doc.  
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capability’; therefore it is natural that considerations were not paid to any provisions 
that might discourage private salvors, even foreign ones.  
 
However, while the current international law framework does not provide a clear 
answer to whether coastal states can forbid foreign salvors to carry out salvage 
operation within its territorial sea and gain economic income thereof, the need of 
clarification is quite necessary.  This is an issue of national policy; yet it is also 
another potential conflict of interests behind the decision of a coastal state authority 
with regard to the place of refuge and intervention measures.   
 
3.3.4 Coastal State’s Right to Give Directions 
 
Article 9 of the 89 Salvage Convention obviously refers to or recognizes the right of 
coastal States to take intervention measures pursuant to the Intervention Convention 
and other customary international law.  The last sentence, ‘to give directions in 
relation to salvage operation’ has a wider implication.  Such directions may not be 
limited to an order to tow the casualty out to open sea, or that the salvage operation 
should be carried out by national salvors, it could also be related to a specific 
operation, e.g. to discharge the cargo to a port reception facility instead of a ship-to-
ship transfer.  Legality of the latter type of directions appears to be conferred by the 
sovereignty of the coastal state over its territorial sea, which is a ‘generally 
recognized principle of international law’, as implied in Article 9. 
 
3.3.5 Article 11 Co-operation 
 
Article 11 of the 89 Salvage Convention apparently imposes certain obligations on 
coastal state when it monitors the salvage operation.  However, it is doubtful whether 
such a requirement is substantial126, because of the vague word of ‘take into account’.  
                                                 
126 See Op.Cit.11 Aldo Chircop at pp.219-220 for detailed discussion. 
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The same expression was used in article V.3 of the Intervention Convention, 
however, in the context of Intervention Convention it was put in such a way as to 
have established an objective standard to determine whether the captioned measures 
are proportionate, though this standard is also not certain and practicable enough.  In 
Salvage Convention, the requirement that ‘A State Party…shall take into account’ 
can hardly be said to have any effective result.  The possible questionnaire to 
whether State Parties have fulfilled this requirement seems to be justified only when 
it is proved that the States had never given a mind to the factors contained thereof; 
and it could be easily overruled with an answer that, ‘those factors have all been 
considered, but they were given up for no reason.’ 
 
Various documents suggest that Article 11 was drafted in consideration of, inter alia, 
places of refuge127.  A preparatory document of the 89 Salvage Convention, CMI 
News Letter Winter 1985 titled The Montreal Draft Salvage Convention suggests 
that, the need to introduce certain rules of public law dealing with salvage had been 
considered by the drafting Committee, including issues concerning mandatory 
salvage in certain urgent cases and the port of refuge.  However, such an introduction 
was eventually given up for lack of a majority support from state parties, as 
expressed in the document, ‘it seems now unlikely that any additional rule of public 
law will be introduced in the new salvage convention’128.   
3.4 Conflicting interests that need to be balanced 
 
It can be seen that since the time when the 89 Salvage Convention entered into force, 
the system to offer remuneration to salvors has changed in a large scope.  Within the 
wide scope where the 89 Salvage Convention is applicable, salvors would be 
compensated by an amount determined according to Article 13 or Article 14, 
whichever is higher; and when LOF is the governing agreement, salvors would have 
                                                 
127 Ibid. See also Brice at 1-388. 
128 See also IMO/LEG/83-13-3, Matters arising from the seventy-fourth session of the Maritime Safety 
Committee: places of refuge, 28 August, 2001; and Op.Cit.105 Salvage (1997 Edition), pp. 10-11; and 
Op.Cit.87 at p 38. 
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a chance to get SCOPIC compensation in replacement of the Article 14.  The 
situation is no longer that, if salvors fail to obtain success in preserving the property, 
they will get nothing at all.  However, if such a failure is a result of the refusal and 
intervention of a coastal State, the salvors are still deprived of the chance of getting 
the higher one of Article 13 reward or special compensation.   
 
On the other hand, had the salvage operation been unsuccessful because of the 
coastal State’s intervention, the salvors would be deprived of the right of exercising 
maritime lien.  Even on the presumption that salvors could arrest sister ships to 
enforce claims for article 14 compensation, the ambiguity and the possible 
differences in the interpretation of ‘salvage’ would add difficulties to such claims.  If 
salvors arrest ships in non-parties to 89 Convention, it is very unlikely that they still 
be entitled Article 14 compensation.  Another difficulty lies with the loss of maritime 
lien, as a result of which, the salvors’ claim would have no priority above other 
claims. 
 
Furthermore, the possible ‘tension’ between foreign salvors and national salvage 
capabilities might need to be paid attention to.  On the one hand, the need to provide 
incentive, namely the salvage ‘income’ to cover up the high maintenance costs of 
national salvage capabilities, no matter they belong to government agencies or 
private entities, should be recognized; on the other hand, it might be the case that 
national capabilities are insufficient and foreign salvors should be welcomed to 
enhance the accident response framework of the State.  Such is a matter of national 
policy, however, harmonization, at least transparency, is necessary for the purpose of 
environmental protection. 
 
Having analysed the public impact of salvage and the roles of places of refuge and 
other intervention by Coastal States, it appears now necessary to re-consider the 
inclusion of relevant public rules.       
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CHAPTER 4    CONFLICTING INTERESTS, RISK-
BASED DECISION MAKING, AND CHANNELLING OF 
LIABILITY 
 
 
4.1  Conflicting interests related to marine accidents 
 
In the drafting of the CLC/Fund Conventions it has been pointed out that ‘one merely 
has to consider the many concerns, organized and individual, public and private, 
national and international, which have direct and indirect interests in the various 
sources of the sea, to appreciate the complexity of the problems involved in any 
regime designed to regulate and control the use of that environment.’129  Such is, of 
course, still the position in considering the issue of places of refuge.  Several 
interested parties would usually be involved in a maritime accident, which include, 
inter alia130: 
a) shipowners, cargo owners, and their respective insurers; 
b) seafarers (and probably passengers); 
c) salvors; 
d) the coastal state, within whose internal waters or territorial sea a salvage 
operation is desired for (hereinafter ‘the coastal State’); 
e) other neighbouring coastal states, whose coasts are under potential danger of 
pollution imposed by the ship in distress (hereinafter ‘third States’); 
f) IOPC Fund, in case of tankers. 
 
                                                 
129 Legal Problems Relating to Marine Pollution by Oil, by Thomas A. Mensah, at p 294. (Publisher 
unknown since this article was obtained as a lecture handout.) 
130 Op.Cit.100 Salvage 1997 Edition contains similar analysis at p.9, however, ‘Administration’ is 
used instead of ‘coastal States’, and ‘third States’ and ‘IOPC Fund’ are not mentioned. 
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When a ship is in need of assistance following an accident, and when safety of life 
onboard has been ensured, the remaining interests at risk would be mainly economic 
ones, while some other aspects would be probably involved.  
 
An intervention undertaken by the coastal State is likely to have impact on all of the 
interests involved.  Properties owners, and consequently their respective insurers, 
would face a greater risk of losing the properties.  Salvors would be deprived of 
various rights such as salvage reward and maritime liens, as discussed in sections 3.2 
& 3.4.  The environment of the coastal State and third states might be better 
protected when the intervention results in less pollution to the coastlines, or might 
suffer a much more severe damage than it could have had the salvage operation been 
successful, as envisaged in the Prestige case. 
 
The interest of the P&I club of the ship in distress may also be influenced by such an 
intervention, through the shipowners’ possible liability on pollution caused by the 
cargo or bunker of the ship.  However, such an influence is probably a minor one 
except when the ship in question is a tanker.  The difficulties to establish liabilities of 
pollution upon shipowners prior to the CLC Convention has been well summarized 
in an English case Southport v. Esso131, and the situation is more or less the same in 
most jurisdictions.  Even if such liabilities are recognized by the national law of 
certain jurisdictions, such a judgment is difficult to enforce when the ship is lost.  
One-ship company is the major form of shipping companies nowadays, and direct 
action to P&I clubs is not likely to succeed due to the general rule of ‘pay to be 
paid’132.  When there is little hope that the HNS Convention and the Bunkers 
Convention will enter into force in the near future, the question remained 
unanswered: how can an injured party get proper compensation for pollution caused 
                                                 
131 Esso Petroleum Co.Ltd. v. Southport Corporation, (H.L.) [1955] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 655; [1956] A.C. 
218 
132 See Edgar Gold, Gard Handbook on P&I Insurance, (Arendal, Norway: Assuranceforeningen 
Gard, 1996) at p. 118; see also Howard N.Bennett, The Law of Marine Insurance, (Oxford University 
Press, 1996) at pp. 339-343. 
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by hazardous cargo other than oil and/or bunker of a non-tanker ship, no matter such 
pollution is caused by an accident or the following intervention.      
 
On the other hand, the interest regime in relation to tanker accidents and pollution 
damage thereto has been substantially changed by the CLC/FC/LLMC conventions 
and their protocols.  According to these conventions, strict liability shall be 
established upon shipowners but for some exceptions; such a liability is limited to a 
certain amount and will, in practice, be paid by the P&I Club.  The part of the actual 
damage, including the clean-up costs, which exceeds the limitation, will be paid by 
the IOPC Fund, provided that the claiming state is a party to the Fund Convention133.   
 
Therefore, in oil tanker accidents, on the one hand, P&I Clubs and the Fund will 
have to pay more compensation, if intervention of the coastal State results in a 
greater pollution.  On the other hand, the coastal states’ interests at risk, at least the 
economic ones, have been substantially reduced, since parties to the Fund 
Convention will, in theory, get full compensation for the pollution damage.  In 
principle pollution damage will be recovered pursuant to the restitutio in integrum 
rule, i.e. to such a degree as if the pollution had not occurred.  However, this is only 
one aspect of the question.   
 
Firstly, the recoverability of pollution damage is subject to the national jurisdiction in 
front of which a claim is brought134.  Locus Standi might be one of the difficulties in 
claiming for damage to the environment per se, since in many jurisdictions the 
plaintiff would have no ‘standing’ before the court unless he is in possession of the 
ownership of the environment135.  Whether ‘pure economic loss’ is compensable also 
                                                 
133 See generally provisions of the CLC / Fund Convention.  See also various articles such as Gotthard 
Gaucci, Ship-source Oil Pollution Damage and Recovery for Relational Economic Loss, The Journal 
of Business Law July 2000, (London: Sweet & Maxwell Limited), at pp 356 – 361,. 
134 See, for instance, Deana Silverstone, Ship source pollution damage, Marine Policy April 1985 pp 
108 - 119, Butterworth & Co (Publishers) Ltd  
135 For general rules of tort see Op.Cit. 51Winfield & Jolowicz on Tort, pp 21 – 23 ‘damage to 
property’. The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico et al v. SS Zoe Colocotroni (1980) 628 Fed. R. 2d 652 
(US Ct. App., 1st Cir.) is widely cited as an example in which the plaintiff (EQB of Puerto Rico) was 
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depends on lex fori and may vary in different jurisdictions, for instance, the loss of 
income of fishermen, who are not able to fish not because their boats and nets are 
polluted by oil but because the area they usually fish is designated an exclusion zone 
following a spill and they have no other place to do the same job136.  The 
appreciation that all losses following a tanker spill is compensable to Fund Parties is 
a general mistake; and that might account for the political pressures that a 
government face in time of pollution even when the State is a party to CLC/Fund.  
The series of cases in which places of refuge were denied by State Parties to Fund 
Convention would naturally lead to a question: is the compensation provided by 
Fund adequate, or satisfactory? 
 
Secondly, the compensation payable by IOPC Fund is limited to a certain amount.  
High as it is, it is all the same limited and might probably be lower than the 
admissible damage following a catastrophic accident.  The total amount payable for 
any single accident before 1 November 2003 was approximately USD196 million, 
while the total claims arising out of the Prestige incident might be 6 times of that 
figure137.  Such might explain for the recent foundation of the Supplementary Fund, 
which raised the total compensation amount to approx USD1,100 million138.      
 
Last but not least, though Fund Protocol 92 has 88 state parties up to present time, 
concerns of non-parties about ‘un-insured’ pollution damage are obvious and 
understandable.  The memory of the Tasman Spirit might be still fresh, in which, the 
                                                                                                                                          
held to be the ‘property party to sue’ because it was the ‘trustee of the public trust in these (natural) 
resources’.  See also E.D.Brown, Making the polluter pay for oil damage to the environment: a note 
on the Zoe Colocotroni case, Lloyd’s Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly, August 1981, p 323; 
and Gottland Gauci, Oil Pollution at sea: civil liability and compensation for damage, (John Wiley & 
Sons), pp 253 – 256.   
136 See IOPC Fund 1992 Claims Manual, April 2005 Edition, pp 10 – 11.  For instance, the English 
court is notorious for being strict in deciding the recoverability of pure economic loss for fear of 
opening a ‘floodgate’, see typically Landcatch Ltd. v. International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund, 
[1998] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 552; [1999] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 316.     
137 See The International Compensation Regime and the International Oil Pollution Compensation 
Funds, handout of Mans Jacobsson, Director of IOPC Fund, in his lecture at WMU on 4 August 2005.  
Such information is also available on IOPC Fund website,  http://www.iopcfund.org.  
138 Ibid. p 12. 
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injured state seemed to appreciate that it had no better choice to get adequate 
compensation but to arrest the crew and the salvage master.  While comment on that 
incident is not a task of this article, the case might lead to a question in relation to 
place of refuge: should the fact whether or not a State is a Party to IOPC Fund, and 
therefore whether or not it is capable of being better compensated in case of oil 
pollution, be taken into account in the consideration of ‘proportionate intervention 
measures’?  If yes, does it imply that non-parties would have more ‘liberties’ in 
taking intervention measures? 
 
Furthermore, pollution is not the only possible result of an accident.  Sinking of the 
casualty in a traffic lane or in a port working area might give rise to damage such as 
wreck-removal costs and economic loss following a port closure, which could be of a 
high amount. 
 
4.2 Risk-based Decision Making 
 
Various distinguished authors have pointed out that an optimal result ‘is achievable 
through better informed decision making and a more organized and cooperative 
approach to places of refuge’139.  Evaluation needs be carried out by the coastal State, 
as early as when they make decisions as to whether to offer a place of refuge or not.  
The key issue of the evaluation would be, what would happen if the ship in distress 
were towed out, and what if otherwise, typically, salvage operation was permitted 
and a place of refuge was offered.   
 
Both aspects inevitably involve the assessment of the condition of the ship in distress, 
inter alia, its stability and strength as well as the outer impact to it, such as the 
prevailing sea conditions and the towing operation.  The latter aspect, expectation of 
                                                 
139 Op.Cit.11 Aldo Chircop at p 221.  See also Op.Cit.13 Richard Shaw at pp.335-336, and Op.Cit.E.E. 
Mitropoulos at p 56; Joop Timmermans, Places of refuge and the best environmental option, BIMCO 
Review 2004. 
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the outcome of the salvage operation, involves more or less the same factors, but 
specifically, salvage capabilities available and details of the salvage plan are needed 
to be taken into account in order to draw a scientific and accurate conclusion.  But in 
reality, how difficult is it to make a scientific and accurate evaluation? 
 
4.2.1 Assessment of damage stability and damage strength 
 
Construction of ships is required to comply with certain international standard, 
typically the SOLAS and the Loadline Convention.  However, the stability and 
strength of the ship need to be re-assessed, especially when the hull or other internal 
construction of the ship has suffered a damage in an accident.  Such statistics can be 
accurately calculated, provided that necessary data are available, and these data 
include some drawings of the ship as well as the location and scope of the damage. 
 
On the one hand, various computer programmes have been developed to assist in 
salvage analysis, such as the Shipboard Contingency Planning System developed by 
ABS140.  With the developed computer technology calculation of damage stability is 
no longer a time-consuming and arduous task as it might used to be in the time of 
Torrey Canyon.     
 
On the other hand, one of the difficulties arises from the availability of the Line 
Drawing, which is necessary for the calculation of damage stability.  In practice, 
Line Drawings are usually confidential documents of the shipyard.  It reveals the 
design of the shape of the hull, which is crucial to the efficiency of the sailing speed 
and fuel consumption.  Shipyards usually invest large input in the research of ship 
design, and therefore, naturally treat these documents as intellectual properties.  
Though such drawings need to be presented to the classification society for approval 
and certification, they are usually not delivered to shipowners, and no international 
                                                 
140 See Op.Cit. 72 Reassessment of the Marine Salvage Posture of the United States, at p. 47, footnote 
9. 
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conventions, nether MARPOL or SOLAS, require such a delivery141.  Thus, it is not 
surprising that when calculation of damage stability becomes urgent and necessary, 
delays would be caused in obtaining the drawings, if they are obtainable at all. 
 
A private approach might provide a good example of solution.  As advised by Mr J. 
Dimitrakopoulos, Marine Business Development Manager of Lloyd’s Register, LR 
provides Emergency Services to its customers.  Statistics necessary to accurately 
evaluate the condition of a casualty were imported in an electronic database, and a 
calculation software has been developed.  When the ship has suffered a structural 
damage, information of the damage can be sent to LR and an accurate outcome of the 
damage stability and damage strength will be available within a very short time.  
Such services are provided on a 24 hour basis, though it’s available to its customers – 
shipowners only. 
 
4.2.2 Details of the damage 
 
More important probably is the details of the damage, for instance, the exact location 
of the hole in the hull and its shape and dimensions.  The question would 
immediately follow, that, how can these data be obtained? 
 
A rough estimation can sometimes be made by eyes at sea, but when the damage 
occurs to the underwater part of the ship, a more complicated inspection is necessary.  
It can be carried out in a dry dock, or by divers when the sea condition permits.  
Diving operation is difficult in rough seas, and in such a case, inspection cannot be 
carried out unless in a sheltered place – the place of refuge.  When the inspection is 
to be done in a dry dock, the casualty would have to enter port also.  Here comes the 
dilemma: how can the authorities decide whether or not to offer a place of refuge 
                                                 
141 The US OPA 90 requires all tankers to have all damage stability information readily available, see 
33 CFR 155.1035© (5).  However this is not applicable to non-tankers, nor is it an international 
convention. 
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when the evaluation has not been effected, yet how can they make a scientific 
evaluation without an inspection in the place of refuge? 
 
The answer might be found in the coastal State’s obligation to ensure that 
intervention measures are proportionate.  Though States have absolute obligations to 
offer a place of refuge, when a refusal is to be followed by an intervention – which is 
almost certainly the case - the duty is on the State to determine whether such an 
intervention has taken into account all the probabilities and consequences in a 
balanced way.  Though international law does not provide a formula as to the 
rankings of such probabilities and consequences, it seems that, at least, states taking 
measures without much – or enough – investigation into the whole situation of the 
casualty would be acting in a reckless way. 
 
4.2.3 The Procedure – lack of uniformity and transparency 
 
Another question is, whose duty it is, to ‘spontaneously’ obtain those data necessary 
for the authority to make an evaluation?  The issue might be better to be looked at 
from both the private and the public aspect. 
 
4.2.3.1 Salvor’s obligation – best endeavours 
 
Salvors’ obligation under LOF is expressed in a simple way: ‘The Contractors … 
hereby agree to use their best endeavours to salve the property…’ (article A of LOF 
2000) 
 
The concept of ‘best endeavours’ has been considered by English judges in a number 
of non-salvage cases.  Surprisingly, there does not appear to have been any 
authoritative determination of the meaning of ‘best endeavours’ in the context of 
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salvage, although the obligation was explicitly provided for in the very earliest forms 
of LOF142. 
 
In Terrel v. Mabie Todd & Co.[1952] 2 T.L.R. 574, Sellers J. Held that the obligation 
to use best endeavours involved a standard of reasonableness which was that 
‘…of a reasonable and prudent board of directors acting properly in the interests of 
their own company and applying their mind to their contractual obligations…’ 
 
In IBM United Kingdom Ltd. V. Rockware Glass Ltd. [1980] FSR 335, CA, it was 
held that the duty to use best endeavours was 
(1) a duty to do all that could reasonably be done (Buckley L.J. at 339), or 
(2) to take all those steps in their power that a prudent, determined and 
reasonable owner, acting in their own interests and desiring to achieve that 
result would take (Buckley L.J. at 343, Geoffrey LJ concurring at 348); 
(3) to take all those reasonable steps which a prudent and determined man, acting 
in his own interests, would have taken if there was a reasonable prospect of 
success (Geoffrey Lane LJ at 345). 
 
IBM was followed by Mustill LJ in Overseas Buyer v. Grandex S.A. [1980] 2 
Lloyd’s Rep. 608 at 613(lh).  And in Pathe Screen Entertainment Ltd. V. Handmade 
Films (Distributors) Ltd. (21st June 1991, unreported), Morland J. preferred the 
approach taken in Terrell v. Marbie Tod to another line of cases in which it was 
suggested that the obligation involved leaving ‘no stone unturned’143. 
 
Salvors’ duty of care is also well established through a series of English cases.  In the 
celebrated case The Neptune [1842], 1 W. Rob, p.297 at p300, per Dr. Lushington, it 
was stated that ‘in order to entitle [salvors] to a salvage reward…they must show that 
they possess skill commensurate with their vocation and condition in life, and 
                                                 
142 See Op.Cit.83 Brice at paragraph 8-20. 
143 The cases and analysis contained in the above four paragraphs are quoted verbatim from a 
confidential Advise Note by Lionel Persey Q.C., with his kind approval. 
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adequate to the duties which they undertook to perform.’144  This requirement of skill 
is not only a footnote to the interpretation of ‘best endeavours’ but also a standard of 
the implied obligation of salvors under English law when salvage is not carried out 
pursuant to an agreement.    
 
Article F of LOF 2000 reads: 
‘Duty of property owners: Each of the owners of the property shall cooperate 
fully with the Contractors.  In particular: 
… 
(ii) the Contractors shall be entitled to all such information as they may 
reasonably require relating to the vessel or the remainder of the property 
provided that such information is relevant to the performance of the services 
and is capable of being provided without undue difficulty or delay; 
(iii) the owners of the property shall co-operate fully with the Contractors in 
obtaining entry to the place of safety…’ 
 
An overall appreciation of the above appears to lead to the conclusion that, in salvage 
operations pursuant to LOF – if not in all cases – salvors are owing a duty to do 
whatever reasonable for the purpose of salving the property.  In simple words, 
salvors are expected to know what he should to as professional salvors, while the 
property owners are in a position to co-operate.  
 
When authorities of the coastal State take control of the response action, as they are 
legally entitled to, certain approval from such authorities becomes necessary for the 
salvors to perform his salvage operation pursuant to LOF.  Then to persuade the 
authorities with supporting data and scientific analysis would fall into the work scope 
of the salvors, provided that such data are available, and there is a reasonable hope of 
success in the persuading. 
 
                                                 
144 See also F.J.J.Cadwallader, The Salvor’s Duty of Care, (Marit.Stua.Mgmt, 1973) at pp. 13-16 
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Inter alia, when access to a place of refuge is pending on decision of local authorities, 
it is the salvors’ task – not the casualty owners, at least unless they have agreed 
otherwise – to apply for a permit145.  This is, in the author’s point of view, a 
reasonable arrangement, not only because of the salvors’ ‘leading’ position after they 
undertake the task to salve, but because professional salvors are expected to possess 
certain skills that ordinary ship owners lack, and to exercise and effect such skills in 
the whole process.  Article F(iii) appears as a recognition of such an arrangement, 
though the ‘place of safety’ might not necessarily be the ‘place of refuge’. 
 
However, there exists certain ‘undue difficulty or delay’ in obtaining some relevant 
information – probably the Line Drawing as aforementioned - while article F(ii) 
seems to be based on an awareness of such a situation.  More complicated is the 
relation between a place of refuge and the inspection of the damage, as discussed in 
section 4.2.2.  If information necessary for a scientific and accurate evaluation of the 
relevant probabilities and consequences are unavailable for reasons out of the control 
of the salvors and property owners, they shall not be charged with any liabilities. 
 
Furthermore, such a duty of salvors is under LOF and English law.  The situation 
under other forms of salvage agreement, or in other jurisdictions may be different, 
and it finds no definite answer in the 89 Salvage Convention.  The salvors’ duty ‘to 
carry out the salvage operation with due care’146 is subject to the interpretation of 
competent jurisdictions.  And, duties of salvors providing service on a fixed-rate 
basis are not clear and might lead to consudion. 
 
4.2.3.2 Procedure of Application 
 
                                                 
145 Interestingly, in the Prestige case, parties consistently stated that ship owners had applied for a 
permit to enter a place of refuge and such an application had been refused by the Spanish authorities. 
146 89 Salvage Convention Article 8.1.(a). 
 58
The duty of care on salvors is only in the ‘private’ side, which they owe to the 
property owners when they undertake the task of salvage147.  Whether such an 
obligation is due under the public law is in doubt.  No international law expressly 
poses such a duty on the salvors as to provide such necessary information to 
decision-making authorities, or to make them aware of the importance of such 
information in the evaluation and the difficulties in obtaining them.  The national law 
of some jurisdictions may have some relevant requirements, such as submitting the 
salvage plan for approval, but these requirements lack uniformity as well as 
transparency.  It is not surprising that salvors have not been able to know to whom 
they should apply, and what should be included in the application, when they take up 
the task to salve; and they are not expected to have such knowledge within a short 
period of time as necessary in urgent situations, unless they, or their lawyers, happen 
to be very familiar with the procedures of the coastal State.  Unlike ‘normal’ 
shipping, in which plenty of shipping agents are ready to provide profound services 
and information with regard to the procedures and formalities, international salvage 
industry does not enjoy the privilege provided by such a network.    
 
4.2.3.3 Who’s in control 
 
The right of Coastal State to control salvage operations having been explicitly 
recognized (as discussed in section 3.3.4), the need to exercise such control is quite 
self-evident.  However, who within the government organization has the decisive 
power might give rise to two general concerns148.  The first one is that, the 
bureaucratic framework of authorities might confuse the salvors and the shipowners, 
while involvement of too many government departments might make the government 
response slower and less effective.  The second question is whether such persons in 
control have the necessary specialist skills.  The UK approach of SOSREP and the 
                                                 
147 Ibid., Article 8.1 ‘The salvor shall owe a duty to the owner of the vessel or other property in 
danger…’. 
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establishment of National Response Centre of USA are recommendable solutions, as 
will be further elaborated in Chapter 5.  
 
4.3 Channelling of Liability under CLC/Fund Conventions 
 
The aforementioned CMI questionnaire reflects the general state attitude that coastal 
states are accountable when they act negligently; reference was made to the 
channelling and immunity provisions of the CLC Convention.149  In order to have an 
accurate appreciation of the liability channel set forth in the CLC Convention, it is 
necessary to examine the exact wordings contained in its articles, mainly Article III 
paragraphs 1-5.   
 
Paragraph 2 appears unable to provide exoneration to the owner, since it is difficult 
to define a place of refuge as one of the navigational aids, let alone to attribute a duty 
of maintenance on the States150.  Paragraph 3 apparently offers ‘negligence’ as an 
‘escape’, but then the test of negligence would become a question at dispute.  
Existence of a duty of care, and breach of that duty, are generally recognized as the 
basic ingredients to determine negligence, but what a duty does the coastal State owe 
exactly?  In particular, are the decision-making officers expected to possess certain 
professional expertise as to enable them to make a scientific evaluation?  What if the 
approaches they take are ‘correct’ but the outcome is ‘wrong’?  And, does the coastal 
State have the obligation to assign capable and competent officers to the positions 
they are now acting on?  Some criticisms attributed the cause of the Prestige disaster 
to bad seamanship of the decision making authorities, but are they reasonably 
                                                                                                                                          
148 See Report of Lord Donaldson’s Review of Salvage and Intervention and their Command and 
Control, Pub H.M.S.O. 1999 Cm. 4193, at pp 39 – 40.  See also Reassessment of the Marine Salvage 
Posture of the United States, at p. 47. 
149 Op.Cit.28 CMI Yearbook 2003at pp. 327 - 328 
150 The Swedish case The Tsesis seemed to have highlighted the inadequacy of such wordings; the 
interpretations of ‘other’ might vary in different jurisdictions, and the difference between 
‘navigational aids’ and ‘aids to navigation’ is noteworthy.  See also Christopher Hill, Maritime Law 
5th Edition, (London, Hong Kong: LLP 1998), at p 425: and Hugo Tiberg, Oil pollution of the sea and 
the Swedish ‘Tsesis’ decision, Lloyd’s Maritime and Commercial Quarterly 1984, at pp 218 – 226. 
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expected of good seamanship?  A safe view might be that, though international law 
does impose certain relevant obligations on coastal States, such as the general one to 
protect and preserve marine environment, and the one to ensure that intervention 
measures are proportionate, these obligations are too general to provide ready answer 
to this question. 
 
Furthermore, when damage to a third state is ‘probably’ caused by negligence of a 
coastal State, the owners – and hence his P&I Club and the IOPC Fund – is still 
liable for the compensation to such a third State, though recourse action is available 
to the negligent State.  In this sense the said ‘channelling of liability’ function of the 
CLC Convention might be more properly put as ‘channelling of responsibility’, since 
the fundamental principle of the Convention – and its actual effect – is that the 
shipowners be responsible for paying compensation regardless of whether he is 
‘liable’ for causing the pollution.  Though in theory the third State can opt to claim 
against the owners or against the negligent State, in practice, it is of course much 
more ‘convenient’ for it to choose the owner, leaving the tremendous task of 
recourse with the owners.  In addition to the difficulties to claim pollution damage by 
‘traditional’ negligence, and the difficulties in the proof, political and diplomatic 
concern could sometimes hold back a state from acting against another state.  The 
situation is the same with IOPC Fund: it always has to pay the compensation, even if 
shipowenr is exempt, and in a later stage, can choose to exercise the right of recourse, 
which it inherits from the shipowners by subrogation.  How likely is it, then, the Flag 
State would borrow its name to support the Fund action?  And, for the compensation 
exceeding shipowners’ limitation, does the Fund have a right of recourse?  This is 
surely not a situation likely to be welcomed by the tanker owners and the IOPC Fund, 
though whether it is an unexpected one is unknown. 
 
On the other hand, as pointed out by some distinguished author, ‘The duty to 
mitigate loss is a legal principle of almost universal application, and it must surely 
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apply to claims where the CLC and Fund Conventions apply’151.  In some 
jurisdictions the failure of mitigation will indeed render the claim for damage 
partially or even wholly in vain, however, the matter is also subject to requirement 
under lex fori, in line with other tests for admissibility of the damage.       
 
Therefore, no matter what are the international obligations of States in relation to 
places of refuge and intervention, the CLC/Fund Conventions have brought the 
shipowners and cargo owners into such a situation as to jointly shoulder the 
responsibility of paying compensation, though such a compensation might be 
recoverable from a negligent State, provided that the burden of proof on negligence 
is discharged. 
 
 
 
                                                 
151 Op.Cit.30 Stuart Hetherington at p 367.  See also Op.Cit.51 Winfield & Jolowicz on Tort at p762; 
and Gotthard Gauci, Oil pollution at sea: civil liability and compensation for damage, (Chichester; 
New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1997) at p 121 especially footnote 4. 
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CHAPTER 5    REVIEW OF PROPOSALS AND 
SOLUTIONS 
 
 
Some actions have been taken and some proposals have been raised, either before or 
after the series of recent incidents.  Some of them attempt to solve the problem by a 
legislative approach and some of them provide a practical solution. 
 
5.1 IMO Resolutions 
 
Two important resolutions were adopted in the first half of year 2004.  Resolution 
A.950(23) Maritime Assistance Services (MAS) dated 26 February 2004 
recommends that coastal States establish a maritime assistance service (MAS) as a 
contact point in a distress scene between parties involved.  This guideline, no doubt, 
when being effected by States, would efficiently avoid the chaos in communication, 
as evidenced in various cases.   
 
A previous resolution adopted on 2 December 1997, Resolution A.851(29) General 
principles for ship reporting systems and ship reporting requirements, including 
guidelines for reporting incidents involving dangerous goods, harmful substances 
and/or marine pollutants, recommends that a standard reporting format and 
procedure be established, according to which, reports from ships in distress should 
include brief details of the defects and damage of the ship as well as her ability to 
transfer cargo when relevant.  This approach seems to have, at least partially, 
clarifies the question of what information should be submitted to the decision making 
authorities.  However, it does not deal with other statistics necessary for the 
evaluation, such as the design and drawings of the casualty, since such reports are 
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expected to be simple and contain only essential information152.  Will it have a better 
result if it is developed to include reports from salvors, e.g. their concrete operation 
plan and equipment available? 
 
Resolution A.949(23) Guidelines on Place of Refuge for Ships in Need of Assistance 
dated 5 March 2004 is directed specifically at this issue.  It provides a relatively 
more detailed guideline in making generic assessment and preparatory measures as 
well as making event-specific assessment.  It also states that ‘the coastal State should 
weigh all the factors and risks in a balanced manner and give shelter whenever 
reasonably possible’153.   
 
The positive impact of such Resolutions can be expected154.  However, the question 
of what is ‘balanced’ and what is ‘reasonably possible’ remains unanswered.  
Another possible ‘pitfall’ might be the assumption that the master should undertake 
the assessment (though ‘with assistance of the company and/or the salvor’)155, which 
is not necessarily the case in salvage practice, as discussed in section 4.2.3 above. 
And, the inspection recommended by paragraph 3.10 does not solve the problem that 
Authorities are not willing to allow oil-leaking tankers to approach the coastlines 
even for the purpose of inspection.  The need to protect salvors’ interests is not 
mentioned, either.  Finally, IMO Guidelines are only recommendations after all.  
Whether and to what degree they will be carried into effect is still up to the 
independent will of States.  Though indeed guidelines are much more easy to be 
adopted and provide much quicker practical support than treaties156, if unwillingness 
of States to offer places of refuge is not resolved, and if some States adopt a more 
active policy in offering places of refuge, casualties in the vicinity might somehow 
be ‘encouraged’ to head for those ‘more lenient’ States.  It might not be so fair that 
                                                 
152 Annex to the Resolution section 1.1 
153 Ibid. P9 
154 See Op.Cit.3 Aldo Chircop at pp 36-46, Op.Cit. 13 Richard Shaw at pp 335-343, Op.Cit. 41 
Mitsopoulos at pp. 56-58. 
155 Resolution A.949(23) paragraphs 2.1 & 2.2. 
156 Op.Cit.11 Aldo Chircop at p 220. 
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such States will probably suffer more unrecoverable damage, as discussed at supra 
pp.50-51.   
 
While recognizing the significant contribution of these IMO Resolutions, it has to be 
realized that they ‘constitute a practical modus vivendi for a non-resolvable 
problem’157. 
 
5.2 EU Directive 
 
As early as 27 June 2002 the European Parliament issued a Directive 2002/59/EC 
with regard to the vessel traffic monitoring and information system, as part of the 
‘Post-Erika Package’.  Article 20 specifically aims at the issue of Places of refuge, 
which reads: 
 
‘member States, having consulted the parties concerned shall draw up, taking 
in account relevant Guidelines by IMO, plans to accommodate, in the waters 
under their jurisdiction, ships in distress.  Such plans shall contain the 
necessary arrangements and procedures taking into account operational and 
environmental constraints, to ensure that ships in distress may immediately 
go to a place of refuge subject to the authorisation by the competent 
authority.  Where the Member State considers it necessary and feasible, the 
plans must contain arrangements for the provision of adequate means and 
facilities for assistance, salvage and pollution response.   
Plans for accommodating ships in distress shall be made available upon 
demand.  Member States shall inform the Commission by 5 February 2004 of 
the measures taken in application of the first paragraph.’ (emphasis added) 
 
Firstly, the Directive recognizes that entry to places of refuge is subject to the 
authorisation by the authorities.  Secondly, as pointed out by Richard Shaw in Places 
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of Refuge – International Law in the Making?158, European states hold different 
views in whether such places should be published.  Some states prefer an open 
declaration while others are reluctant to ‘disclose them for fear of provoking either 
an outcry from the local authorities of the area concerned, or a flotilla of 
decomposing ships heading towards them’.   
 
While the debate and actual actions within EU members are in their way,  it could be 
said that, at least the EU Directive has encouraged its member states to prepare 
places of refuge for ships in need of them, which, might help to reduce the number of 
‘not in my backyard’ attitude and actions in the future, within EU.     
 
5.3 US Recommendations – decision tools & pre-designated 
areas 
 
As pointed out by US National Research Council in Reassessment of the Marine 
Salvage Posture of the United States(1994), ‘in the absence of predesignated safe 
havens, the risk is increased of marine casualties having catastrophic outcomes with 
environmental consequences.’  It was therefore recommended that ‘The Coast Guard 
should promulgate the process by which a “safe haven” is identified.  To the extent 
possible, area plans should evaluate candidates sites for potential safe haven 
areas.’159  It was also recommended that ‘To safely address the safe haven issue and 
provide the COTP with the necessary decision tools and information for emergency 
situations, a formal analysis program, such as the one for making a decision to use oil 
dispersant, is needed, with predefined areas for safe havens such as the tiered 
dispersant areas.’160 
 
                                                                                                                                          
157 Op.Cit.3 Aldo Chircop at p 31. 
158 CMI Yearbook 2003 at p339 
159 Reassessment of the Marine Salvage Posture of the United States, at p62. 
160 Ibid. p 53. 
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Comparing with the EU Directive, the US Report has gone a step further in 
recognizing the ‘risk-based’ nature of the decision making, and in proposing to offer 
a decision making model to COTP (captain of the port), who will, in normal situation, 
decides on whether or not a place of refuge is offered.  Comparing with IMO 
Resolutions, a decision-making formula in the form of national legislation will be 
more compulsory and better implementation can be expected.  However, uniformity 
in international law and ‘equal play rule’ can not be achieved by this approach. 
 
5.4 UK Approach - SOSREP  
 
In Report of Lord Donaldson’s Review of Salvage and Intervention and their 
Command and Control161, it was pointed out that conflict of interests could exist 
even between the various government agencies of a country.  It was therefore 
recommended that an individual called the Secretary of State’s Representative or 
‘SOSREP’ be appointed as the focal points of all government agencies and act as an 
interface with the owners and salvors.     
 
This proposal is similar to the IMO Guidelines in Maritime Assistance Services, in 
established a single communication channel.  It is actually a step ahead, since on the 
one hand it was published as early as 1999, on the other has taken into account the 
factors specific to salvage.  Moreover, it has given consideration to the expertise of 
such a person, his knowledge in the legal and practical regimes governing pollution 
prevention and salvage etc.   
 
UK has followed the proposal in appointing the Secretary of State’s Representative 
for Maritime Salvage and Intervention, and it was highly praised by Mr Hans van 
Rooij, an executive of Smit Salvage, the lead salvor of the Prestige162.  Indeed it is a 
substantial improvement in avoiding a confusing and ineffective situation where too 
                                                 
161 Pub H.M.S.O. 1999 Cm. 4193.  See also CMI p 342 
162 Lloyd’s List December 05 2002, Smit boss would not alter the way operation was handled 
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many government departments are giving orders.  The one little defect might be that, 
whether the SOSREP has the final authority to decide on the offering or refusal of 
places of refuge is not specifically mentioned. 
 
5.5 Proposals From Salvage Industry 
 
Archie Bishop, legal advisor to the ISU and consultant with Holman Fenwick & 
Willan, has pointed out the implication of places of refuge in its interrelation with 
‘places of safety’163.  He also called for more input of experts in the decision-making 
process, which is in line with the proposals of Joop Timmermans, President of the 
ISU164.  In addition to other proposals that are incorporated into the IMO Resolutions, 
Joop Timmermans called for ‘no rejection without inspection’, ‘adequacy of salvage 
cover’ and ‘guaranteed salvage cover’.  The latter offers a practical solution to the 
dilemma of national policy as discussed in section 3.3 and 3.4.      
 
5.6 A New Convention 
 
Proposals have also been made, to establish a new international convention on places 
of refuge, which should read: ‘States are obliged to offer ships in need of a place of 
refuge when this is necessary and proportionate to the damage.  A State shall be 
liable for the damage caused by an unjust refusal to offer a place of refuge.’165 
 
This clear-cut approach would no doubt be enthusiastically supported by ship owners, 
salvors, P&I clubs and the IOPC Fund.  However, resolute opposition from States 
could almost certainly be foreseen.  Monetary incentives were proposed as a method 
to encourage the adoption of such a new rule; how effective can such incentives be 
                                                 
163 Salvors: the need for responder immunity and places of refuge, Oil Pollution 22-23 April 2002, 
(London: Lloyd’s List Events) at pp 1-11. 
164 Places of refuge and the best environmental option, BIMCO Review 2004, pp 64-65. 
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expected will be discussed below.  Furthermore, the word ‘proportionate’ is still 
inevitable in the expression, while its ambiguity and lack of practicability is almost 
equally inevitable. 
 
5.7 Incentives to coastal States 
 
A call to provide adequate economic incentives to coastal States has been made, 
typically by allowing coastal States providing places of refuge to share salvage 
reward166.  Similar view is taken by the International Association of Ports and 
Harbours, which commented that ‘Only an all-embracing system where all damages 
and costs incurred in the course of a place of refuge situation would be covered 
would allow public and/or port authorities, given the limited decision time, to focus 
on the key issue: refusing or granting a ship in distress access to a place of refuge on 
technical and environmental grounds’167.  Detailed approaches include providing 
standard Letter of Guarantee168, economic compensation in the form of salvage 
reward169, and establishment of Supplementary Fund170. 
 
When ‘compulsory’ measures – i.e. the adoption and implementation of international 
law - appear to have little support, providing incentives would seem a much more 
practicable solution.  However, some uncertainties go with this approach.   
 
The first problem is whether such incentives are adequate to ‘set-off’ the concern of 
public authorities, namely, the unrecoverable pollution damage and the possible 
public and political pressure.  Coverage of normal port charges and admissible 
                                                                                                                                          
165 Welmoed van der Velde, The Position of Coastal States and casualty Ships in International Law, 
CMI Yearbook 2003 p491 
166 Stuart Hetherington, Civil liability and monetary incentives for accepting ships in distress, CMI 
Yearbook 2003, at pp.457 – 467. 
167 Liz Booth, Any port in a storm? Maritime Risk International Vol. 19 Issue 6 June 2005 at p15. 
168 Op.Cit.160. 
169 Op.Cit.159. 
170 See supra pp 50-51. 
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damage claims appear insufficient.  How much, then, is sufficient?  This question 
might be better left to be determined by negotiation postures and powers. 
 
The second question is what form shall such ‘extra’ incentives take.  If coastal States 
are entitled salvage reward pursuant to Article 13, then their remuneration depends 
on the success of the salvage operation, and States’ willingness to provide place of 
refuge will vary according to the probabilities of the outcome.  If the incentives 
include compensation in the nature of Article 14 special compensation, then they 
may be able to provide a stronger motivation.  However, the task to fix the accurate 
amount of such compensation may give rise to new confusion and uncertainties.   It 
seems extremely difficult to determine the ‘actual expenses’ of maintaining and 
providing a place of refuge.  Therefore it seems better to take the form of fixed-rate 
similar to SCOPIC. 
 
The third question is who should bear such incentives.  In case of major tanker 
accidents, the P&I clubs and the IOPC Fund benefits most when places of refuge 
effectively avoid severe pollution; and H&M and cargo insurers will also benefit 
when loss of the property is prevented.  If these parties should jointly shoulder the 
costs of incentives, what should be the portion among themselves?  And 
consideration must be given to the fact that IOPC Fund only has a limited number of 
State Parties.  Should non-Parties be awarded with such incentives, even if the 
potential pollution does not threat the environment of a State Party?  The author is of 
the view that they should, since the potential pollution is inherent in the dangerous 
nature of the cargo.     
 
5.8 Summary  
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The first four approaches as aforementioned are in line with the evolving 
precautionary principle in marine environmental protection171.  The IMO Resolutions 
are a combination of almost all other three approaches, as well as part of the 
proposals from salvage industry.  The legislative and the incentive approach can 
serve as additional methods, to establish a more complete framework. 
 
However, two legal deficiencies need to be reviewed.  One is the relevant clauses of 
UNCLOS, in relation to innocent passage and State’s right within their territorial sea 
as well as the ranking between such rights and their obligations in environmental 
protection.  The other is the public rules in relation to salvage. 
 
In addition, two practical problems remain unsolved, namely, the difficulties in the 
assessment of damage stability, and the expertise required of the decision-makers.
                                                 
171 See Op.Cit. 18 Ian Brownlie at pp.275 – 276.  See also Derek V.Ellis, The precautionary principle 
and the environmental monitoring, Marine Pollution Bulletin, Vol.46 [8] August 2003, at pp. 933-934. 
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CHAPTER 6    CONCLUSIONS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
As conclusion, the main problems manifest in the issue of places of refuge, which 
remain unsolved by the IMO Resolutions, are as follows. 
 
From the legal perspective: 
1. The confusing provisions of UNCLOS, especially those in relation to the 
right of innocent passage of ships in distress, and to the right of Coastal States 
in the Territorial Seas, as discussed supra pp 11-14. 
2. Lack of practical and objective formula for the determination of 
‘proportionate’ measures, as discussed supra pp 15-17. 
3. Want of certain public rules in relation to salvage, such as for the 
transparency of national policy (section 3.3) and for the uniformity in the 
application procedure (section 4.2.3). 
 
From the practical or management aspect: 
1. Difficulties in damage stability assessment (section 4.2.1). 
2. Need of expertise in decision making (section 5.4). 
3. Pollution compensation and recourse problems (section 4.1 & 4.3). 
 
It is therefore recommended that: 
1. Review of UNCLOS Articles 18, 194, 195, 211 and 221. 
2. Amendment of Salvage Convention to include: 
2.1 State Parties shall publish national policies in relation to salvage operations 
by foreign salvors, including the national policy and the pre-qualification or 
permit application requirements.  
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2.2 An International Places of Refuge Fund (hereinafter IPOR Fund) shall be 
established, jointly sponsored by the insurance industry of State Parties.  
Ships flying flags of State Parties shall be issued IPOR Certificate.  State 
Parties shall offer places of refuge to such ships in need of assistance.  Such 
places should be pre-designated and accessible without prior application or 
permit.  Usage of such places shall be compensated by a fixed rate, calculated 
according to the tonnage and type of the ships, multiply the actual time of 
stay of such ships in such places.  Such a compensation shall be paid by the 
IPOR Fund.  In case of tankers, an additional compensation shall be paid by 
IOPC Fund, provided that the owners of the cargo carried onboard are 
nationals of State Parties to IOPC Fund.  Such provisions shall not prejudice 
the right of State Parties over such ships, including giving orders to salvage 
operations, or for the ship to leave the territorial sea.  However, States Parties 
shall not order the ship to leave the internal waters or the territorial sea before 
an inspection and evaluation is carried out according to IMO Guidelines, 
except for security reasons or for preservation of human safety, or unless 
there is no reasonable hope that the inspection and/or the evaluation can be 
carried out. 
3. Amendment of the SOLAS Convention to the effect that, ships flying flags of 
State Parties have readily available electronic architect data for the purpose of 
emergency evaluation.  Such data can be maintained by designated competent 
organizations (typically Classification Societies) and shall be available on 24 
hours basis. 
4. Amendment of the IMO Resolution A.949(23) to recommend States to 
consider the expertise of person responsible for MAS.  States shall also be 
recommended to provide training to staff of Authorities, or propaganda to the 
general public, in relation to the principles and techniques of environmental 
protection and risk-based decision making. 
 
 73
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 
BOOKS 
 
Brian D. Smith, State Responsibility and the Marine Environment (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1988). 
 
C. Baptist, Salvage Operations, (London: Stanford Maritime, 1979). 
  
Center for Oceans Law and Policy (University of Virginia School of Law), United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982: A commentary, II 
(Dordrecht/Boston/London, 1993). 
 
Christopher Hill, Maritime Law 5th Ed. (London, Hong Kong: LLP 1998).  
 
Churchill, P.R. & Lowe, A.V., The Law of the Sea, 3rd Ed. (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1999).  
 
Colin de la Rue & Charles B. Anderson, Shipping and the Environment – Law and 
Practice (London : LLP 1998). 
 
Comite Maritime International, CMI Yearbook 2002 (Antwerp). 
 
Comite Maritime International, CMI Yearbook 2002 (Antwerp). 
 
David C. Jackson, Enforcement of Maritime Claims, 3rd Ed. (London; Hong Kong: 
LLP 2000). 
 
Edgar Gold, Gard Handbook on P&I Insurance (Arendal, Norway: 
Assuranceforeningen Gard, 1996). 
 
Edward M. Brady, Marine Salvage Operations (Cambridge: Cornell Maritime Press, 
1960). 
 
Francesco Berlingieri, Berlingieri on Arrest of Ships – a commentary on the 1952 
and 1999 Arrest Conventions, 3rd Ed. (London; Hong Kong: LLP, 2000) 
 
Geoffrey Brice & John Reeder (editor), Brice on the Law of Salvage, 4th Ed.(London: 
Sweet & Maxwell, 2003). 
 
Gotthard Gauci, Oil pollution at sea: civil liability and compensation for damage, 
(Chichester; New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1997). 
 
 x
Howard N.Bennett, The Law of Marine Insurance, (Oxford University Press, 1996). 
 
I.A.Shearer (Editor), The International Law of the Sea, Volume II by D.P.O’Connell 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984). 
 
Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 6th Ed. (Oxford University 
Press, 2003). 
 
IMO Manual On Oil Pollution, Section III, Salvage (1997 Edition), (London: IMO 
Publication, 1997).  
 
J.G.Starke, Introduction to International Law, 10th Ed. (London: Butterworth, 1989). 
 
Mohammed Bedjaoui(General Editor), International Law: Achievements and 
Prospects, (Paris: UNESCO, 1991), Chapter 17, International State Responsibility, 
by Eduardo Jimenez de Arechaga and Attila Tanzi, and Chapter 27, Permanent 
Sovereignty over Natural Resources and Economic Activities, by Georges Abi-Saab. 
 
Norman Hooke, Maritime Casualties 1963 – 1996 2nd Ed. (London: LLP, 1997). 
 
Patricia W. Birnie and Alan E. Boyle, International Law and the Environment 
(Clarendon Press , Oxford). 
 
Proshanto K. Mukherjee, Maritime Legislation, (WMU Publications, 2002).   
 
Sir Rupert Cross, Statutory Interpretation, 3rd Ed. (London: Butterworths, 1995). 
 
W.V.H.Rogers, Winfield & Jolowicz on Tort, 16th Ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 
2002). 
 
William Rann Kennedy & Francis Rose, Kennedy and Rose on Law of Salvage, 6th 
Edition, (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2001). 
 
William Tetley & Robert C. Wilkins, Maritime Liens and Claims, 2nd Ed. (Montreal; 
Quebec: Editions Y. Blais, 1998). 
 
 
ARTICLES 
 
Aldo Chircop, ‘Living with ships in distress – a new IMO decision-making 
framework for the requesting and granting of refuge’, WMU Journal of Maritime 
Affairs, 2004, Vol. 3, No. 1 
 
Aldo Chircop, ‘Ships in distress, environmental threats to Coastal States, and places 
of refuge: New directions for an ancient regime?’ Ocean Development and 
International Law, Vol. 33 (2002) 
 xi
 
Archie Bishop, Salvors: the need for responder immunity and places of refuge, Oil 
Pollution 22-23 April 2002, (London: Lloyd’s List Events) 
 
D.J. Devine, ‘The Cape’s False Bay: A Possible Haven for Ships in Distress’, South 
African Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 16, 1990/91 (Verloren van Themaat 
Centre for Public Law Studies, University of South Africa).   
 
Derek V.Ellis, The precautionary principle and the environmental monitoring, 
Marine Pollution Bulletin, Vol.46 [8] August 2003. 
 
Derry Divine, ‘Ships in distress – a judicial contribution from South Africa’, Marine 
Policy Vol. 20 No. 3, 1996. 
 
Efthimios E. Mitropoulos, ’Places of refuge’, BIMCO Review 2004. 
 
Eric Van Hooydonk, ‘The obligation to offer a place of refuge to a ship in distress’, 
Lloyd’s Maritime And Commercial Law Quarterly, August 2004 
 
Frank Wall, Improvements and deficiencies from a government viewpoint, Salvage 
Conference Papers, (London: Lloyd’s of London Press, 1990) 
 
Gotthard Gaucci, Ship-source Oil Pollution Damage and Recovery for Relational 
Economic Loss, The Journal of Business Law July 2000, (London: Sweet & Maxwell 
Limited). 
 
Hugo Tiberg, Oil pollution of the sea and the Swedish ‘Tsesis’ decision, Lloyd’s 
Maritime and Commercial Quarterly 1984. 
 
Joop Timmermans, Places of refuge and the best environmental option, BIMCO 
Review 2004. 
 
Liz Booth, Any port in a storm? Maritime Risk International Vol. 19 Issue 6 June 
2005 
 
Michael J.lacey, Expansion of the Salvage Industry to meet Modern Requirements 
and the Need for Substantial Rewards to Sustain the Industry, Salvage Conference 
Papers, (London: Lloyd’s of London Press, 1990). 
 
Richard Shaw, ‘Places of Refuge – International Law in the Making?’ CMI 
Yearbook 2003.  
 
Stuart Hetherington, ‘Prestige – Can the law assist?’, CMI Yearbook 2003. 
 
 xii
Thomas A.Mensah, Deficiencies found in the Regime Established under the 1910 
Salvage Convention, Salvage Conference Papers (London: Lloyd’s of London Press, 
1990). 
 
Welmoed van der Velde, ‘The position of coastal states and casualty ships in 
international law’, CMI Yearbook 2003. 
 
 
INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS 
 
Convention on Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims 1976 and Protocol 1996 
(LLMC) 
 
Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other 
Materials, 1972. 
 
International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules relating to the Arrest of 
Seagoing Ships, 1952. 
 
International Convention on Arrest of Ships, 1999 (not in force) 
 
International Convention on Maritime Lien and Mortgage 1993 
 
International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, 1969, and  
Protocol 1992. (CLC) 
 
International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for 
Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage (FUND), 1971, and Protocol 1992. (FUND) 
 
International Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in cases of oil 
pollution casualties, 1969, and Protocol 1973.  
 
International Convention for the Protection of Pollution from Ships 1973 as modified 
by the 1978 Protocol thereto. (MARPOL 73/78) 
 
International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Co-operation, 
1990. (OPRC) 
 
International Convention on Salvage 1989. 
International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue, 1979. (SAR) 
 
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974, and Protocols 1978 and 
1988. (SOLAS) 
 
 xiii
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982 (UNCLOS) 
 
Vienna Convention on Law of Treaties 
 
 
NATIONAL STATUES & LEGISLATIONS 
 
Directive 2002/59/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 June 
2002 establishing a Community vessel traffic monitoring and information system and 
repealing Council Directive 93/75/EEC 
 
Marine Traffic Safety Act 1983 (China) 
 
Merchant Shipping Act 1995 (UK) 
 
Oil Pollution Act 1990 (USA) 
 
 
INTERNET SOURCES 
 
IMO ‘Information Resources on the Erika Accident and the 2001 amendment to 
Regulation 13 G of Annex I to MARPOL 73/78’, 
http://www.imo.org/includes/blastDataOnly.asp/data_id%3D11910/Erika%283May2
005%29.doc 
 
International Salvage Union website, http://www.marine-salvage.com 
 
Lloyd’s Agency Salvage Arbitration Branch website, http://lloydsagency.com 
 
Lloyd’s Agency website, Salvage cases report, https://www.lloydsagency.com/ 
Agency/Salvage.nsf/vwSalvageCases/952F3D178BA3850580256C7E00573320?Op
enDocument, reported by Smit Salvage B.V. on November 13, 2002. 
 
Proposal for maritime transport, by Nunca Mais.  See Coordination Marée Noire 
website, http://www.coordmareenoire.net/article.php3?id_article=150 
 
Remolcadores Nosa Terra S.A. (Spain) website, http://www.remolcanosa.com/en 
 
WTO website, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/mtn_gns_w_120_e.doc 
 
 
DOCUMENTS 
 
CMI Newsletter Winter 1985 The Montreal Draft Salvage Convention 
 
 xiv
 xv
IMO Resolution A.851(20) General principles for ship reporting systems and ship 
reporting requirements, including guidelines for reporting incidents involving 
dangerous goods, harmful substances and/or marine pollutants (2 December 1997) 
 
IMO Resolution A.949(23) Guidelines On Places of Refuge For Ships In Need of 
Assistance (5 December 2003) 
 
IMO Resolution A.950(23) Maritime Assistance Service (MAS) (26 February 2004) 
 
IMO/LEG 90/8 Supplementary Report on Places of Refuge, submitted by CMI on 11 
February 2005,  
 
IMO/LEG/83/13/3, Matters arising from the seventy-fourth session of the Maritime 
Safety Committee: places of refuge, 28 August, 2001 
 
Lloyd’s Standard Form of Salvage Agreement (No cure – no pay), and Special 
Compensation P&I Clause 
 
Maritime Safety Proposals Baltic 2004, Maritime Safety Conference Baltic 
December 2004 
 
National Research Council (USA) Reassessment of the Marine Salvage Posture of 
the United States (National Academy Press, 1994) 
 
Lord Donaldson’s Review of Salvage and Intervention and their Command and 
Control, HMSO, 1999 
 
THE TORREY CANYON, Report of the Committee of Scientists on the Scientific and 
Technological Aspects of the Torrey Canyon Disaster, HMSO, 1967 
 
 
WMU DISSERTATIONS 
 
Jean Ver Pugal Pia, Conflicting Territorial Claims in the South China Sea (2003) 
 
Xu Jing Jing, Assessment of salvage award under Lloyd’s Open Form, (2000) 
